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
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
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## A REVIEW

OF

# MR. CAMBRELENG'S REPORT

FROM THE

COMMITTEE OF COMMERCE,

IN THE

House of Representatives,

AT THE FIRST SESSION OF THE TWENTY FIRST  
CONGRESS.

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BY MEPHISTOPHELES.

*Leaves of the Pendleton*

I follow thee, like a trusty servitor, but to entice thee from thy nimble and  
crafty wanderings, into a surer path of truth. The time lacks an honest  
devil. Thou canst not say I flatter.—*Old Play.*

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## REVIEW, &c.

The Report from the Committee on Commerce, in the House of Representatives, at the present session, is the last in a series of assaults which have been made upon the protective system of this country, and being prepared with great care and industry, and adopted by certain interests in the Union, with an exulting acclamation, it may fairly claim to be considered the manifesto of, what is called, the free trade party. The City of New York has been thrown into convulsions of joy by this masterly and concentrated blow at the American system:—it is the *coup de grace* given by young David to the Philistine, and the host are ready to sing the *Non Nobis*, on the occasion of the victory.

To us, who are at a distance from this fervour, who have nothing to fear from the contagion of opinion, and nothing of interest to inflame us on the question, we are left to make up our minds merely upon the merits, which, it will be admitted upon a perusal of the report, are but a feeble auxiliary to the cause of the good people of Gotham, compared with the *ardor prava civium jubantium*,—the authoritativeness of the Exchange, and the wisdom of Wall street. Indeed, from all that we can learn upon the subject, the author of the Report has already discredited the Scriptures, and gained more honour as a prophet in his own country than he is likely to acquire out of it.

Mr. Cambreleng professes to be a disciple of the school of Mr. Huskisson. He adopts his tone, borrows his thoughts, reasons on his premises, believes his facts, and concludes with his advice. Whatever Mr. Huskisson conceives to be salutary in English policy, Mr. Cambreleng conceives, in the same terms, to be wholesome in American. The Report is calculated to answer the purposes of

the British Ministry, in many respects, better than Mr. Huskisson's speeches. In all the outward and visible signs of statesmanship the two politicians are as much alike as Dromio of Syracuse, and Dromio of Ephesus:—but in the particular of principle and postulate, of abstract opinion and relative policy, there are scarcely to be found two individuals, separated by the sea, of more incongruous elements. Mr. Huskisson, with the address of a wily minister, has given a false lead, which Mr. Cambreleng follows, in no wise doubting;—and, from the state of the game, it is quite apparent that the American has walked into the trap which the Englishman has set for him.

To explain this, it is necessary to say something of this much talked of doctrine of *Free Trade*, a doctrine which we have always found ourselves much puzzled to define.—We understand it only, as a beautiful abstraction;—a systematic resolving of things into a state of nature;—an equalization of human appetites, passions and interests;—an interminable confraternity, existing in unimaginable harmony, and moving to the musick of the spheres:—an anticipated millenium of peace on earth, and good will to men:—the polity of More's Utopia and Rabelais' Medamothy.—Mr. Huskisson and the Edinburg Review have obscurely hinted that this wonder has, at length, made a lodgement in Great Britain.—And Mr. Cambreleng believes them!\*

In Great Britain, then, it becomes a tangible thing, and we may hope to form a more intelligible opinion of its nature and attributes, by a reference to the British system. Free trade, in this view of it, may be said to be comprehended in the following leading maxims.

1. To exclude from the home market all competition in such commodities, as they can produce or manufacture.
2. To feed their own people, entirely with their own products though at double the cost that they could be fed by foreigners.

\* "Great Britain has granted commercial liberty to her vast empire at home and abroad, and has taken a new start in the race of nations." Report p. 21. "Her naval ascendancy gives her, *all the advantages of free trade*, by her dominion over the commerce of the world: in peace she secures *all its privileges by abolishing restrictions and opening as far as she can, by her own laws, every avenue of trade.*" ib. p. 26.

3. To take nothing from abroad but what they cannot do without.
4. To nurse their manufactures, first for the sake of the home market, and secondly, for the sake of commerce.
5. To secure by the most rigid laws, the transportation of their own products, in their own vessels, and to use every stratagem to get the carriage of the products of other nations.

We may add as a sixth maxim,

To use all kinds of means to persuade the world to adopt exactly the opposite policy;—and especially to humbug American wise-  
acres with dissertations upon free trade.

It would not occur to the people of the United States, after reading Mr. Cambreleng's report, that such are the fundamental articles of the British faith; and as it is necessary to have this matter understood, in order that our learned chairman's encomiums may be properly valued, we shall take a little time to prove what we have said.

Mr. Huskisson's speeches afford us a full exposition of all his doctrines of free trade and will enable us, therefore, to determine how far we have departed in our policy, from his great improvements in legislation. His speech of March 25, 1825, explains his plan of reducing the duties. Here he states in very plain language, his object, to be, to recommend alterations in the duties "levied upon the importation of materials employed in some of our principal manufactures, and also in the *prohibitory* duties, now imposed upon the manufactured productions of other countries, so far as they shall be found not inconsistent with the protection of our own industry."\*

\*In our remarks upon Mr. Huskisson's alleged free trade system, we confine ourselves to the *design and scope* of his measure; his professed object being to propose a system efficient to every purpose of protection.—We are aware of the mischiefs produced by some of the details of his plan, and especially in regard to the silk trade, which has been so much boasted as a victory of the free trade principle; although that trade experiences, at his hand a degree of encouragement that we should consider ample to most of our manufactures.—It has, however, produced its unlooked for distresses, as the late sufferings at Spitalfields and Coventry will testify. But for the present, we deal with Mr. H's. principles, not his acts.

Beginning with the cotton manufactures, Mr. H. sets out with the broad declaration—which we deem important to be considered—“*that, by the cheapness and quality of our goods, we undersell our competitors in all the markets of the world.*”—With this enunciation, he thinks that the duties of  $67\frac{1}{2}$  and 75 per cent. by which this manufacture had been fostered, might now with safety to the manufacturer, be reduced as low as 10 per cent. He affirms that under this protection of 75 per cent. this branch of industry had risen to maturity\*—that their exports of cotton had increased in sixty years from £200,000 to £30,795,000; and that it was no longer necessary to subject it to any other restriction than 10 per cent.—that amount being equivalent to the duties levied upon the raw materials employed in the fabric.—But this 10 per cent. is to be added to the amount of any internal duty on printed cottons, and no drawback to be allowed.

In the woolen manufacture, the duties varied from 50 to  $67\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. These he thought, for the same reasons that operated upon his mind in reference to the cotton, might be reduced to 15 per cent.

In the manufacture of linens, Mr. Huskisson's plan embraces a reduction to 25 per cent. over and above the amount of any internal duty of excise.

The reduction generally proposed in the duties upon manufactured metals, is to 30 per cent. upon glass to 20 per cent. above

\* It may be a little edifying to our statesmen to learn from Mr. Huskisson his opinion of this 75 per cent. It may teach us how to estimate the notions of the trans-Atlantic champions of Free Trade. Speaking of the woolen manufacture, he says “*this favourite child, like other favourites, has suffered rather than profited by being spoiled and petted, in rearing, whilst its younger brother of cotton, coming into the world much later, has thriven better by being much more left to rough it and make its own way in life.*” Truly, a most ill-favoured bantling! Only 75 per cent. protection! Alas for our own progeny!

Mr. H's allusion to the pampering of the woolen manufacture will be intelligible, by referring to the various forms in which British legislation has been extended to its protection, but more particularly to the act imposing an additional duty on imported wool, by which, it is said, the manufacture received a shock that had nearly proved fatal to it. Let our Southern friends learn, that their cotton is amply assured to them by this experiment.

the excise, except in the case of bottles, which are subject by Mr. H. to a duty of about 85 per cent. The common porcelain ware he proposes to reduce from 75 per cent. to 15;—the painted or gilt to 30.

Such is Mr. Huskisson's scheme in regard to the principal manufactures of Great Britain, and this is trumpeted abroad as a concession to the principles of free trade! In reference to the great mass of these manufactures, he distinctly avows his conviction, that they are already secured from all foreign competition, and that there is not the remotest possibility of their home market being interfered with. Indeed, the extreme solicitude, with which Mr. H. treats the protection of the British manufacture, ought forever to preclude those who pretend to advocate his principles, from bringing his reduction of duties into our view at all.—It is most apparent that his object is the very reverse of Mr. Cambreleng's.—If his purpose were *free trade*, why have we these discriminations; ten per cent. upon cotton, fifteen upon wool, and twenty-five upon linen? And why this constant avowal that he has ascertained that these rates are sufficient to secure to Great Britain the supply of her own market?—His scheme is not to buy where goods are cheapest, but to excite the greatest competition compatible with the preservation of their home and their foreign markets, and to foster the manufacturing interest by a system of legislation, that shall encourage it to its most profitable expansion. As to the operation of this new tariff upon those manufactures which make the wealth and prosperity of England, it is as harmless as a permission extended to all the world to carry coals, free of duty, to the port of New Castle.—Mr. Cambreleng would, perhaps, consider this another concession! But until Mr. Huskisson shall proclaim that a rising and prosperous manufacture shall be sacrificed to the freedom of commerce, and that the temporary inconveniences which the country might sustain in rearing up a new system, that is to be a source of wealth and power to all after ages, are to outweigh the great reversionary benefits of the scheme, we cannot admit that any aid has been supplied to that destructive theory, which has captivated its professors by the name of free trade.

Upon the score of injury sustained by the manufactures in the heavy duties annexed to the introduction of the raw materials,

Mr. H. adopts a principle that in its whole scope and bearing is essentially protective. The reductions proposed by him, on this branch of imports, are at least judicious in their purpose, and may be salutary in the detail—we are not disposed to question them—but in no instance are any reductions recommended without inculcating, in the most explicit manner, that cardinal point in his policy—the immense value of the home supply and the consequent importance of fostering the domestick manufactures, and giving them the ascendancy abroad. Such notions are distinctly enforced in the following remarks upon the introduction of crude copper. "These prohibitory duties have already, in my judgment, been attended with serious injury, they have prevented copper not only in an unmanufactured, but in an imperfectly smelted state from coming into this country. This metal exists in great abundance not only in several parts of Europe but also in some of the new states of America. It would have been sent here as it used to be, in an imperfect state in payment for British manufactures. Here it would have undergone the process of purifying, of rolling, or of being otherwise prepared for consumption, by the means of our superior machinery had it not been kept away by impolitic restrictions.—They operated as a bounty upon the transfer of our capital to other countries, and as a premium to encourage the inhabitants of those countries to do for themselves that, which, greatly to our advantage, we should otherwise have continued to do for them. At the same time, I am aware that considerable capitals have been invested in our copper mines under the encouragement given by the present monopoly, and how difficult it is to do all that the public interest would require without injury to those particular interests. This in almost every instance, is the most arduous task which a sense of public duty has imposed upon me. In the present case however, I believe that I may safely, and I hope with advantage to both parties, propose to reduce the duty on copper from £54 to £27 a ton; without committing myself not to recommend at a future period, even a further reduction, if it should appear that the present limit is not sufficient to *enable our manufacturers to preserve their foreign*

market, and that at a lower rate of duty no great or sudden check would be given to the British mines."<sup>2</sup>

The same protective principle is conspicuous in his policy towards the silk trade. The duties on the raw material were from 4s. to 5s. 7½d. a pound on raw silk—and 14s. 8d. per lb. on organzine or thrown silk:—the consequence was, as stated by Mr. H. that the French manufacturers who had their silk either altogether free (being a home product) or subject to about 4½d. per lb. on what they imported, were enabled to produce the manufactured article cheaper, by this amount of duty.<sup>†</sup> He proposes therefore, a reduction on raw silk to 8d. per lb., and on the organzine to 7s. 6d.—The consideration which governed the reduction on the organzine is in keeping with the rest of his system; it was confessedly, to protect the interests of the throwsters who, it was affirmed, would have been injured by a further reduction. To this was added also a removal of the prohibition upon manufactured silks, and a duty ranging from 35 to 70 per cent. ad valorem substituted for their protection. The duties were reduced also, upon the dye stuffs used in this manufacture, and throughout the whole course of legislation upon the question, every idea of what we understand by free trade was repudiated—the express and earnestly inculcated object being the encouragement and protection of the manufacture.

It would be charging an immeasurable absurdity upon the British Government, if we could suppose that in the event of the home manufacture, by this experiment, being unable to contend against the foreign, they would not increase their duties to a standard adequate to that end. It would be at war with every intelligible idea

<sup>2</sup> So too in regard to Iron Mr. Huskisson, stating the inadequacy of the home supply, and commenting upon the injurious effects of the duty on the manufactured commodity, asks, "Is there no risk or danger to our hardware manufacturers at Birmingham and Sheffield? Give they extensive orders which they receive from abroad if iron continues at its present price or is to rise still higher? how many thousand workmen will be thrown out of employ if this branch of trade be lost to this country?"

<sup>†</sup> "These duties added about 25, 30, and 40, per cent. on the prime cost of the different species of silk on which they were respectively imposed."

{Ed. Review, Nov. 1825.

that they have heretofore promulgated upon the subject. *Great Britain has never been known to abandon a valuable manufacture because it required protection.*

But, it may be asked, if Mr. Huskisson's moderated duties are still equivalent to prohibitions, in the large portion of the manufactures referred to, why are the duties reduced at all?—We answer, that a lower rate of prohibition operates as a stimulus to industry better than a higher one, because it lowers the mark to which the tide of foreign competition and skill must rise in order to flow in upon the home market, and therefore keeps the industry of the country always upon the watch to excel its neighbours;—it is a safeguard against inattention and carelessness, while at the same time it is full and perfect protection. There is another reason. Mr. Huskisson considers that in the present vigour of British manufactures, a duty of thirty, fifty, or seventy per cent. generally adequate to every purpose of protection, and yet sufficiently low to prevent smuggling in the few articles of foreign manufacture which fashion or caprice have brought into request; articles inconsiderable in quantity and sought for only by the richest classes of the Kingdom. As he has himself expressed it, “some fancy muslins from India, some silk stuffs, some porcelain from France,—objects for which curiosity or fashion may create a demand in the metropolis;” and which, as he assures us, “will not interfere with those articles of more wide and universal consumption which our own manufactures supply cheaper and better.” These are regarded as concessions of trifling amount, to the opulent. Their bulk too is small, and the facilities of introducing them very great, whilst the trouble of searching for them, the vexation of being searched, and the expense of the surveillance which is necessary to detect them, are not compensated by the value of the discovery—the game is not worth the candle. The government has therefore consented to their introduction at high rates, while, it is certain that the quality excluded is by far the greatest in quantity and the most worthy of protection.

As to the other articles upon which the reduced duties take effect, it is not pretended that any nation has an interest to make the effort to introduce them: their age and their prosperity place them beyond assault. Whether cottons are rated at ten or ten hundred per

cent. the prohibition is just the same: "It is not as deep as a well, nor as wide as a church door—but it is enough—it will serve."

Mr. Huskisson gives us another reason for this apparently nugatory measure, which indicates a deeper knowledge of the materials he has to work upon abroad, than we should at first have attributed to him—a reason that seems to have been well sown when it fell upon Mr. Cambreleng. "It is time," says Mr. H., "to consider if there be no inconvenience, no injustices, no positive injury to ourselves, no suspicion and odium excited in foreign countries, by duties which are absolutely prohibitory,—or, if the articles to which they attach, admit of being smuggled,—which have no other effect than to throw the business of importing them into the hands of the smuggler." He might have added, what, by the way, is pretty plainly intimated—that the reduction might *look* like homage to the free trade illusion, and have power to persuade wise American statesmen of the *sincerity* of Great Britain in support of a system about which she has been perpetually talking, and concerning which she has universally agreed to make no substantial sacrifice: it might induce unlearned and dull rivals to go and do likewise, in circumstances where the imitation of the example would be something more than substituting one dead-letter for another.

With what success this argument may be urged, let the Chairman of the Committee of Commerce and the exalting citizens of Gotham answer! The British *shadow* becomes in the hands of Mr. Cambreleng, a thing of life, and what on one side of the water is but a "gentle sucking dove," bears, on the other, like the true lion, and is instinct with an active principle of mischief.

It is only necessary to read Mr. Huskisson's speech on the subject of the colonial policy, (March 21, 1825,) to make out the rest of the points which we have brought into our definition of the English notions of free trade. This speech breathes the same desire to protect the interest of Great Britain and her colonies against all foreign competition, and his remarks are characterized by the same ardent resolve to support the *protective* system. His object is to assist the northern colonies against the influence of the rivalry of the United States, but in no respect whatever, does he admit the idea that trade was to be regulated by the principle of unrestricted

reciprocity. In one particular his words are remarkable, as the subject has brought him to consider a question, which we have a thousand times asked the friends of British free trade to solve for us,—namely, Why are not the markets of England opened to our grain? We quote from the speech:

"The measure which I have to propose in respect to Canada appears to me to be no more than an act of common justice to that colony. It is simply this—to admit, at all times, the corn of that country into our consumption, upon the payment of a fixed and moderate duty. When it is considered that corn is a staple of that colony, I cannot conceive of a greater act of injustice, than to have declared, to a part of our own empire, as much entitled to protection as any other part of it, that against that staple the markets of this country were closed. How are the Canadians to pay for the supplies which they have drawn from this country? Is it fitting that when they make their remittances in this staple, they should do so without being able to know whether it can be received here?—Whether it is to remain in warehouse, unavailable and unproductive, and at a ruinous expense for five or six years, depending, for its admission into our market, upon the fraction of a half penny, according to the average price in our markets for a few preceding weeks; that average influenced by the conflicting tricks and artifices of the home grower and home dealer; the result of which cannot be known in Canada for many months afterwards?" Might we not ask the champion of British free trade, why does not Mr. Huskisson's interrogatory apply to this country? Are these not the same considerations operating upon us?—We may ask Mr. Cambreleng to give us the answer why, in his brotherhood of nations,—his reciprocal interchange of liberal systems,—and his magical circle of free trade,—these points are not as freely to be urged in our favour, as in that of Canada? Will he assure us that the removal of these restrictions fall in with Mr. Huskisson's plan? The British statesman has not even winked at such a thought. His policy seems to us an unadulterated example of the good old rule,

That he shall take who has the power,

And he shall keep who can.

It was even proposed as an objection to Mr. Huskisson's sys-

tem in favour of Canada, that a removal of the restrictions upon this branch of the trade of the colony, might, perchance, let in some of the forbidden American product by our northern frontier.—What was his reply?—It is a decisive comment on all the refined speculations of Mr. Cambreleng and the whole host of British authorities from which he has taken his opinions.—It expounds the whole debated question of British free trade. “He should be quite willing to adopt any method necessary to prevent the fraudulent mixing of the United States’ corn with the corn of Canada”—“that with a view of removing all cause of alarm and giving an adequate security against the fraudulent introduction of Canada (American) wheat, he should propose as a clause, by way of rider, that there should be the same certificate of origin as in the case of sugar.” He was willing to rate the production of Canada at a certain amount, and consider all beyond that amount, as American.

In accordance with his views of the colonial policy, Mr. H. proposed to admit flour from the Canadas at about five shillings the quarter; timber at from five to twelve per cent. and tobacco at twenty. The duty on the first of these commodities coming from the United States, is left almost at total exclusion; and, upon the remaining two, at a rate ranging between five hundred and fifteen hundred per cent!

Now we do not mean to condemn the policy of Great Britain’s opening an unrestricted intercourse with her own dominions—(although we think Mr. Cambreleng has but a poor case of free trade, amongst the countless restrictions of the British colonial possessions,\*)—its natural tendency would be what Mr. C. has stated it—

\* They protect the tea of the East Indies by a restriction that costs the people of Great Britain something upwards of two millions sterling per annum. In turn, they levy a duty upon the sugar of these possessions to protect the markets of the West Indies; while, again, these latter are excluded from all the benefits of an enlarged commerce, in order to favour the Canadas, which of late, have been blessed with the gift of a free trade. In sooth, she is a most discriminating mother!—And Mr. Cambreleng thinks this last measure of grace has been conceded to the principles of Adam Smith!—So far as it is the means of stabbing at the prosperity of the United States, it is the measure of the ministry.—What of it belongs to the free trade doctrine, is an idle coincidence.

an increase of the navigation of the colonies; but we cannot perceive what aid this furnishes to the propagation of the free trade system. We have always understood this mystical blessing to look to the intercourse of one nation with another. For free as Mr. Cambreleng pretends Great Britain has made the trade with her colonies, it is nothing compared with the entire disenthralment of that between our own maritime states—which trade, by the by, Mr. Cambreleng has very seriously undertaken to prove has been languishing in this pure atmosphere of freedom:—Of this, however, hereafter. But until Mr. Huskisson, or some other English minister shall consent to remove the impediments that embarrass our intercourse with that nation, we have at least a right to claim the benefit of the example in practice, and of the fact in the argument.

Such are the lights which British doctrines and British practice afford us in our inquiry after the nature and attributes of free trade. Truly, the thing, when found, looks marvellously like our *protections*: and we wonder that the free trade gentlemen of America, who profess to follow Mr. Huskisson, should abandon their leader at the most striking point in his philosophy; that which, of all others, seems to be the tenderest object of his solicitude, *the prosperity of the manufactures*. Mr. Huskisson is a competent and authentic witness on the subject, and, we are free to say, that we are willing to stand by the award of his testimony. We believe that a better illustration of that gentleman's doctrines could not be afforded, than in the policy inculcated by the manufacturing interests of the United States.

In this expose of the British system, it will be seen how minute is the resemblance between the measures of Mr. Huskisson and Mr. Cambreleng; and how true is the assertion of the honourable chairman, that we have been adopting the prohibitory policy just at the time that our rival is “substituting free trade for restrictions.”

—We cannot but admire the fidelity with which the likeness is preserved between these giants of free trade on either side of the Atlantic.—Mr. Huskisson takes away a nugatory prohibition: Mr. Cambreleng follows suit and is for taking off a necessary protection.—Mr. Huskisson thinks that free trade consists in carrying *British* manufactures, all over the world: Mr. Cambreleng thinks so too.—Mr.

Huskisson talks about opening their ports to the colonies: Mr. Cambreleng talks of opening ours to all nations. Mr. Huskisson would take off the duty from the raw material *in order to protect manufactures*: Mr. Cambreleng would do the same thing, *to encourage commerce*. Mr. Huskisson expatiates upon free trade, at the very instant that he is rivetting the fetters upon it: Mr. Cambreleng is tickled with the sound and expatiates likewise.—Mr. Huskisson throws away a counter: Mr. Cambreleng a guinea.—Mr. Huskisson fails to contriving snares for credulous rivals; Mr. Cambreleng falls—asleep. The resemblance is complete. They are as much alike as Monmouth and Macedon!

We rather think that Mr. Cambreleng must renounce his pretensions to be considered a pupil of Mr. Huskisson, or he will be obliged to confess that his beau ideal of free trade is not to be gathered from the statute books of England.

Then, we would ask, where shall we seek it?—A great deal has been said of late about this same system, but is it not strange that with Adam Smith as current as the Almanack, and Mr. McCulloh and the Ricardo chair, the Edinburg Review, Mr. Cambreleng and the City of Gotham “airing their vocabularies” upon it in all the multiplications of arithmetic, and saying it and singing it through all its moods and tenses, addressed to all languages, people and nations, not one instance is to be found of any one civilized community adopting and pursuing it as a permanent policy?—If it has ever been touched it has been, forthwith, dropped again as something too hot to hold.—We would seriously ask our friends, who are tilting so manfully in this field, where we shall look for some exemplification of their theory? We are difficult of persuasion and unwilling to trust to speculation in matters of so much moment, and we feel particularly distrustful, with the example of Great Britain before our eyes, and our knowledge of her history. We confess that we would rather be dragged along, than merely have the way pointed out for us. The land of Adam Smith, of deep philosophy, of profound inquiry, and of enlightenment that can take in no more light, would surely, before this, have shown us some hot-bed of this new plant. We have seen her manufactures grow up to be the marvel of mankind, and we do not choose to depart from the science of her ma-

chinery. We are not to be cheated by her rhetoric out of our respect for her example. Mr. Huskisson may talk as he will about a prohibition reduced to a prohibition lower in the table; he may attempt to mislead us by disproportioned commentaries upon insignificant acts, or magnify the correction of a plain abuse into an argument against the use. We cannot be deceived. The thermometers of Reaumer and Fahrenheit may indicate the same temperature, although the numbers on the scale are not the same, and we have skill enough to compute the difference, even if Mr. Cambreleng overlook it.—The friends of free trade will scarcely turn us to the example of Holland in 1816, nor to Russia in 1820.\*—If they do, they will be called upon to explain the mystery of the return of the latter of those powers, after that brief space of trial,—“ere those shoes were old”—to the antiquated and condemned systems by which she previously marched on to wealth. They will have to explain the deep and pathetic complaints which resounded through both of bankruptcies, beggary and ruin, that marked the days of the experiment, and when the free trade advocates have given us *their* solution, we shall ask them to give us, besides, the Dutchman and the Russian's own avouch for their account of the matter; we shall ask this, because we are not willing to take another speculation to make out a matter of fact. We have had experience enough of the adroitness of our philosophers in conjuring up theories at home.

\* Mr. C. however, does refer to Russia with a sweeping reproof of her present prohibitory system. In page 21, of the Report he tells us that under the present system, “her resources must be comparatively stationary and her navigation depressed. Her naval power can never be formidable under such a system.”—We beg leave to refer the learned chairman to Count Nesselrode's exposition of the misfortunes experienced by that Government during her short experience of the free trade system—from 1820 to 1822, (the date of the minister's circular.) We would also ask him if he includes this power amongst our rivals, when he expresses his alarm that we had been “already driven too far in the rear of all our rivals, for national power and naval ascendancy?”—If our policy has brought us even below the rivalry of Russia, we have a right to ask the chairman farther, whether he considers our restrictive system as more severe than hers?—She has upwards of fifty classes of articles prohibited in her tariff:—We have not one. If not, how comes this about? ‘Your reason, Jack?’

In despair therefore of being enlightened in these profound secrets of free trade, we shall e'en turn, after all our peregrinations abroad, to our friend Mr. Cambreleng, and endeavour to make out, as well as we can, what is the veritable and specifick idea to be attached to the term. Perhaps, his own lucubrations will throw some light upon the matter. If we fail in getting satisfaction from this quarter—then Heaven help us! We renounce the enterprize as a bad job,—and shall cease thenceforward to regard it as a matter of reason, or a matter of fact, but a plain matter of breviary, to be believed *se del carbonari*.

It seems, from the report, that this great desideratum in national blessings was enjoyed to the fullest extent, from the adoption of our constitution until the year 1807. Until that year navigation was "the favorite object in all our early legislation," and the prosperity of the United States is commented on, by the honorable chairman, with a fond and affectionate interest. This then was the era of free trade,—and these the golden days of *non-restriction*.\* It might astonish an unlearned reader to be told that during this very period (from 1790,) so pointed and severe were the restrictions imposed upon all foreign tonnage, by our government, and so rigorous the protective system, adopted as a fundamental article of our policy, that the clamour of Great Britain against the *illiberality* of the measure, almost amounted to "declarations of direct hostility. A tonnage duty of fifty cents per ton, and an additional duty of 10 per cent. on the merchandize imported, were exacted from all foreign vessels entering our ports. It was considered as a contumacious defiance of Adam Smith, and the most flagrant violation of the sacred principles of that free trade which Mr. Cambreleng

\* We are anxious to let Mr. C. speak for himself. "The unparalleled growth of our navigation anterior to 1807 is the best evidence of the influence of free trade and moderate duties on national prosperity: its present stationary or declining condition the saddest commentary on the policy of restrictions."—*Report* p. 20.

The wise Dr. Cooper says in his tract upon the alteration of the Tariff in 1823, "For thirty years past we have steadily pursued the prohibitory system." Doctors differ.

holds in such veneration.\* The effect of this policy was to produce the splendid results described by the report. It gave that impulse to our navigation which instantly elevated it from its cradle, into a vigorous manhood, and sustained it through a glorious career of successful adventure that, perhaps, was never equalled in the history of any other state. These restrictions were continued until the convention of London in 1815, having become the subject of endless strife with the government of Great Britain, and been principally instrumental in producing the war of 1812. By this convention they were surrendered, and from that period, so far as regards Great Britain and the United States, the navigation of the two countries was placed upon that reciprocal footing of equal privileges, that, to the extent of the intercourse contemplated by this measure, was a full and perfect realization of the most undisputed principles of free trade. Mr. Cambreleng has shown, that up to this period (throwing the season of war and its accompaniments out of the question) our navigation regularly increased, while that of the British as regularly declined;† thus confining the prosperity of our shipping to these days of discrimination and protection against foreign rivalry, and then adducing the fact in support of his theory of

\*The present anxiety manifested by all parties in Great Britain to persuade us against the policy of our protective measures, exhibits a state of feeling precisely similar to that displayed in 1791 upon occasion of the adoption of our navigation laws. Glasgow was in an uproar, and the most melancholy forebodings were indulged as to the injury this system was likely to work upon the shipping interests of Great Britain. As usual, the free trade philosophers condemned the measure as one of harsh import and pernicious tendency. It was reserved for Mr. Cambreleng to discover, that this protection of our navigation by discriminating duties, was one of the developments of the free trade principles.

“† Previous to these political restrictions from 1789 to 1807, our country presented a spectacle of prosperity which had never been surpassed by any nation in any age. We had not then learned to intermeddle with private employments. We had no heavy taxes to encourage smuggling, diminish consumption, and repress industry; we had no stimulants but profit and enterprise—no guides but intelligence and judgment. We had it is true, discriminations minute and manifold, but happily for the country, our imposts were moderate, our speculations harmless, and our trade was free.”—Report p. 2. See also, p. 20.

free trade. It is somewhat astounding to have such an argument thrust upon us,—because we are really not prepared for it. It is taking us upon our strong suit;—it is, in fact, trumping our lead.—But perhaps we are mistaken, and have been all along in the error, of imagining that free trade meant a trade free of protecting duties while, on the contrary, it meant a trade free to us, and shut up to all the world beside.—We ask pardon.—But our further examination does not clear up the difficulty,—for Mr. Cambreleng has discovered, that ever since the convention of London the tables have been turned and our navigation has been on the decline, or at best but stationary, whilst the British has been leaping forward with the bound of the grey hound; indeed, as Mr. Cambreleng observes, "She is even overhauling our our own navigation in the direct trade with that country."

Now it would occur, we think, to a direct mind, to attribute these effects to the most proximate and intelligible cause. We should say, that for the first period above mentioned, the protection of American industry, in all the branches of navigation, afforded by the plain solid and unequivocal tariff of 1790, gave an advantage to this interest which secured it from all foreign competition; while the repeal of this tariff, by the convention of London, took away this protection and exposed our navigation to all the dangers of a fearful competition with a vigorous and sagacious rival. It is true, that during the first period, the system was not extended in any striking degree beyond our navigation: and the expediency of that was obvious. Our position as a neutral, amongst a world of belligerents, pointed out to us the wisdom of gathering, in the harvest of commerce. Our population was small, our agriculture not overstocked, and our markets good; why seek new sources of industry when there were no idle hands? why desert a field, which was left for our reaping, until it might be too late to gather the crop?—We were well—we could not be better.—We owed no part of our success to free trade, except to that sort of free trade which consisted in having it all to ourselves. The principle of reciprocity had gone to the winds;—it never entered into our imaginations. The world was busy in cutting each others throats, and we were busy in keeping them alive.

But in 1815, a new state of things presented itself. Our rulers,—how wisely, we leave Mr. Cambreleng to determine—chose to let go the restrictions and we entered, once more, upon the theatre of commerce, with as different sensations as those with which Henry Morton visited the Bothwell-brig after his return. The same zeal that had before pursued the engrossing purpose of war, was now displayed in the sunshiny enterprize of peace.—Our productions increased with our population;—we had left off carrying the products of other nations, and were anxious even for the privilege of carrying our own; our exports multiplied in quantity, and diminished in value; \* and our importations exceeded them in amounts that fastened upon us heavy debts, which we could only pay in specie.—Our gold and silver took wing; and the withdrawal of these sentinels of our paper currency, gave that imprisoned creation the free scope of the air. It pervaded all space, affected all values, and brought on that pestilence of unwholesome credits, that had nearly overwhelmed the nation. In this state of things, we were forced to turn to our reserved sources of prosperity.—The tariff of 1816 is not deserving of consideration as a measure of protection. It was in its greatest bearing but a measure of revenue.—It was, in fact, but the reduction of the war rates, and those unfortunate beings, who were deluded into the belief that it was capable of protecting an expensive infant manufacture, learned wisdom at the most dreadful temporal sacrifices. As, however, these great interests of the country found favor in the sight of the government, and the successive improvements of subsequent legislation upon them, began to be felt, the nation steadily revived under the process; and every year a new impulse was given to the most valuable of our energies.—

\* Cotton has always been our chief export. The following statement will show the increase in quantity and diminution in value. We compute by millions without referring to the fractions.

1807	Exports of cotton.	66 millions of lbs. value \$14 millions.
1815		82 17
1820		127 22
1823		173 20
1825		176 '36
1826		204 25

Notwithstanding the effect of British competition upon our tonnage, and the increase of the ratio of that portion of their shipping employed in our trade, our own navigation vigorously and rapidly augmented. We say this, in the face of Mr. Cambreleng's assertions to the contrary—We shall, in the sequel of our remarks, make good our ground. For the present, our inquiry is confined to an investigation of the principles of free trade.

So far as this investigation goes, we think we are warranted in concluding, that Mr. Cambreleng's vision of non-restriction will prove to be somewhat like that of Mr. Huskisson, with the exception, that it does not extend to the protection of any industry but that employed in navigation; and we are mainly doubtful if his measures are even the best for that. His will, however, is good, and we sincerely believe that he is quite in earnest in his zeal to increase our commerce. He is an enthusiastic merchant, and the most zealous of New Yorkers. He has a natural tide-water liking about him;—is in extacies with the thought of increased commissions, and sedately intent in his project of converting New York into Liverpool,—even by the transfer of the population. His whole conceptions of national prosperity are summed up in a compensandious system of fetch and carry. He would like to carry every thing raw, across the ocean, and bring back every thing made up. It would delight him to have the flour of New York, baked in London. All the sinew and muscle of the country, in his estimation, are concentrated in her tars, her wealth in her ships, and her gentlemen in her factors. Five per cent. for selling, and two and a half for buying are the most exquisite of domestic operations; and long speeches, about free trade, the most charming of diversions. We do not feel inclined to interfere with his tastes, nor would we disparage the lofty pretensions of our good friends in Gotham, but we are not quite so liberal in our prejudices in her favour. We think it a fallacious idea, that our navigation is our *greatest* interest. We do not think its rise or decline “the index of our national prosperity and power.” We have no fears of our commercial marine, nor of our want of a vigorous, brave and triumphant navy. We see no reason to believe, that either the one, or the other will be prejudiced by the protective system. On the contrary, we are convinced that

their surest reliance, and most healthful nurse will be found in that very system. Navigation is the handmaid of manufactures,—it is an arm, and a valuable one, of our power, but it is neither the head, nor the body. It can only flourish upon the cultivation of our other sources of industry; and notwithstanding the hypocondrical auguries, and ill omened sighs of Mr. Cambreleng over the departing vigour of this sturdy and gallant concern, we have seen it, and still see it, increasing with an exulting step. Our coasting tonnage moves like a giant, and our foreign, with the occasional fluctuations of different years, advances to its destinies with a stride that already has struck many a fearful misgiving into the heart of our rivals. We say this, for the comfort of Mr. Cambreleng, and with some hope that it may reconcile him to the perverse destiny of looking upon a prosperous commerce lifting its head from the midst of the phantoms of the protective system.

With these remarks, we take our leave of Mr. Huskisson's and Mr. Cambreleng's free trade, having persuaded ourselves that, in regard to the system of Great Britain, they have both been guilty of a misnomer. We have found nothing to give us a just notion of its applicability to human affairs. We end our search where we began. It is a chimera;—a pleasant diversion of the philosophers to amuse an idle hour;—an article of faith with Mr. Cambreleng; and a hoax with Mr. Huskisson. It is the Bottle Imp, which every man persuades his neighbour to buy, and which no man is willing to keep;—constantly falling in value and never bringing what it costs; a fruitful instrument of juggling, that consigns the unfortunate wight that holds it, at the lowest farthing, to the power of the fiend. “Miscreant devil! if I again call on thee for thy services, it is that I may rid myself of thee forever!” We would give our country the benefit of the moral—“touch not, taste not!”

We have much more interest in analizing Mr. Cambreleng's argument upon the tariff, and we approach this task better satisfied with the undertaking, because, however ambiguous the doctrines of the learned chairman, and the followers of his school may be, on the subject of free trade, their objections against the tariff are, at least, intelligible. We have no difficulty in understanding their import. It is a question of opinions and facts; of predictions and results, and we can compare them.

It is worth while remarking the amount of promiscuous obloquy that has been cast upon this measure, and that has assailed it in every stage of its growth; and how like a plant of stubborn virtue it has grown in spite of tempest and foul weather. If half that is said of it were true, it is one of the most pervading causes in nature. Do prices rise, or sink,—or a bank break,—or a factory fall, or a merchant overtrade himself and burst by repletion,—or undertrade and collapse by attenuation,—the earth multiply her abundance,—or refuse her stores—the people emigrate or stand still,—our rivals starve or prosper, it is all resolvable into the tariff. It meets all emergencies, supports all theories, consorts with every possible state of facts, and furnishes a compendious and universal solution of all difficulties.—There is nevertheless one thing perplexing about it: in spite of persuasion and prophecy, it obstinately refuses to check the growth of internal improvement, to lessen our commerce, to rob the revenue, or even to starve the people. Our state physicians are constantly feeling the public pulse and holding consultations upon the case; it is hard for them to determine whether we get better or worse. Their embarrassments are full as vexatious as that of the worthy leech whose patient exhibited the anomalous symptoms described in the following summary: "Doctor, I eat well, drink well, and sleep well;—what can be the occasion of it?"

The reply may be equally as applicable in the mouths of our friends:

"Ah, my dear sir, I will give you something to cure all that."

We are not quite sure, that on the subject of the tariff, Mr. Cambreleng will be considered the oracle of the party,—always excepting the City of Gotham, where we do not venture to question his authenticity,—but of the anti-tariff party at large;—that numerous and respectable portion of our fellow-citizens, who object to the tariff policy from all the different considerations that general, personal, local and peculiar interests have conspired to collect:—a body of malcontents on sundry grounds. One party objecting, because it does not protect equally: a second, because it protects at all:—a third, because it is against their private interests: a fourth, because it is against the constitution: a fifth, because it is against General Jackson; and a sixth,—a small, and simple party—because it is against Adam Smith! Although, it is obvious, that Mr. Cam-

breling's objections are intended to cover the whole ground. He holds with them all, and takes it to be, in whatsoever regard it may be considered, altogether a thing accursed:—desecrated to the full measure of the malediction upon Obediah, “for tying these knots.”

It is our purpose to bring these several opinions of Mr. Cambreleng into array, in order that we may test them by the evidence to which they appeal, and by their relationship to each other. The report has the merit, except in but few particulars, of being clear and intelligible in its language. It exhibits the intrepidity of assertion that belongs to a writer who is proud of his responsibility, and means to stand by it: we run the less risk, therefore, of misrepresenting him. His principles may be comprehended in the following points:

1. The doctrine “that restrictions are the best means of permanently securing cheap commodities,”—is an antiquated absurdity.—(vide page 5.)
2. That the protective system has been prejudicial to our own domestic industry, which “would go far towards furnishing our own supplies under a system of imposts, high enough to *encourage manufacturers*, but not so high as to encourage gambling.”—(p. 8.)
3. That it is utterly incompatible with our confederated form of government.—(p. 14.)
4. That restraints on foreign commerce diminish the value of agricultural produce.—(p. 6.)
5. That they tend to increase the tide of emigration, and are now reducing the New England states to a condition “as unimportant as any one of the members of the German confederacy.”—(p. 6.)
- 6: That the protective system has given rise to a most formidable contraband trade, while, at the same time, it has encouraged monopolies, diminished consumption, and oppressed the poorer classes of society with grievous burthens.—(p. 12, 27 et passim.)
7. That it is destructive to navigation, and has given us ground to fear that our naval ascendancy is far in the rear of all our rivals.—(p. 18.)
8. “That no nation, whether of Europe or America, *can contend*, in manufactures, with Great Britain.”—(p. 7,)—and that “the *only* result of our taxation must be to perpetuate the ascendancy, *even in our own markets*, of the manufactures of that nation.”—(p. 9.)

9. That notwithstanding all our legislation, we are as little of a manufacturing people now, as we were at the adoption of the constitution—(p. 6,)—and that “our’s is essentially an agricultural people.”—(p. 7.)

10. And, finally, that our tariff is injurious to every interest, and to every section of the country.—(p. 8.)

Such are the cardinal points in the creed of Mr. Cambreleng, and generally, we believe, of those who stile themselves the advocates of free trade.

It is not our intention to enter into a large discussion of all, or any, of these dogmas. No question that has ever risen in America has been more fully debated, than every thing that appertains to the protective system. It has, literally been drained dry: and, we think, there never was a controversy in which the force of argument was more overwhelming. The friends of the present system have uniformly met the vague, contradictory and indefinite theories of their opponents, with sound conclusions, tested by the experience of the most enlightened nations, and fortified by the constant accumulation of present facts. It has been the singular fate of the advocates of free trade, to witness, in the short career of our own experience, the successive demolition of every ground upon which they have entrenched themselves: They have been floored in every bout. Not one prediction has been verified; not one assertion made good; not one citadal maintained. Our evils, according to these gentlemen, are *yet* to fall upon us: accidental combinations have hitherto occurred to withhold the storm that they have prophesied for us. Even Mr. Cambreleng, who banquets with the gust of an epicure, upon any present horror, is obliged to feast on the hope of *coming* distresses. His sympathies are, mostly, in anticipation: he is condolatory in advance: his sighs are not at sight. He enjoys, therefore, his present minor afflictions with the certainty of a reversion of ill humour which, we predict, is forever fated to follow his jack-o’-lantern fancies at a distance that can never be diminished.

Our business, for the present, is to deal with his facts.

The opponents of the protective system certainly contend at great disadvantage, because they contend against the universal testimony

of nations. They are unable to afford the world the lights of experience. While, on the other side, it is in our power to meet them with the perplexing interrogatory,—Why is it that these sublimated speculations have been constantly urged upon us by those who have all the power to adopt them, themselves, in practice, under the most favourable circumstances, and who, yet, eschew them with the same circumspect avoidance as the veriest ravings of the most dangerous philosophy? Why is it, that Great Britain, with a capital as powerful as the lever of Archimedes, with the very perfection of human craft, and with the most intelligent conductors of human industry, has ever been distinguished for the zeal with which she has descanted upon the captivations of this theory, and yet has never approximated to a recognition of it in any one period of her history?

It is remarkable, that she has never yet seen a nation devote her attention to manufactures, that she did not straightway resort to every expedient of diplomacy, persuasion or force, to induce her to an abandonment of the purpose—all, if we could trust to the sincerity of her professions, for the purpose of improving the happiness and comfort of her rivals. She has occasionally succeeded in the effort, and her victims have uniformly found out their errors in aggravated domestic calamity, and, sometimes, in the total overthrow of their best interests.\*

She is now playing the same game with us. The American tariff has waked up the slumbering serpent of Britain; a serpent that is never seen to move while the British protective systems are unthreatened from abroad, but which is never quiet when England's enemies are guilty of the heresy of following her example.

But to proceed to our examination:

\* Of this, the Methuen treaty, concluded in 1703, with Portugal, is a most conspicuous example.—(Vide Pope's British Merchant, vol. iii. p. 76, and Wealth of Nations, book iv. c. 3.) That nation, with a prosperous and valuable system of manufactures, was persuaded into this treaty, of three short articles, by which she surrendered the right of restricting British manufactures. Her story is briefly told. A thriving nation was reduced to bankruptcy, and a state of dependence worse than colonial vassalage. Mr. Methuen was applauded, and the poor Portuguese laughed at. "Equo, ne creditis Tenet."

Mr. Cambreleng's declarations are over-bold. The "antiquated absurdity" of which he speaks in the *first* opinion that we have imputed to him, is, to say the least of it, not an obsolete one. It is consecrated by the names of the most eminent statesmen of both hemispheres. The very proposition to which he applies it, is, in terms, the proposition of General Hamilton.\* It is the avowed doctrine of Mr. Huskisson:—the "absurdity" upon which England has advanced to empire, and now holds the scales of power for the world:—certainly the most fashionable and reputable of absurdities. —It is, as we affirm, the principle which has operated to preserve the energies of our own people amidst that mighty conflict of civilized nations for supremacy, in the present peace of mankind, and without which we should have sunk into the inconsiderable power that Mr. Cambreleng believes us to be. But, above all, it is "an absurdity" which, if we understand Mr. Cambreleng aright, has the respectable sanction of his own name in its support. His *second* proposition above quoted, affirms the very principle: "our manufactures would go far towards our own supply, under a system of imposts *high enough to encourage manufactures*, but not so high as to encourage "gambling." We ask for no more than a system to *encourage our manufactures*, and our difference with Mr. C., it seems, is not at last, one of principle but one of degree. It is no more our wish to encourage gambling, than it is his. We may have different notions of the rate of imposts necessary for the purpose of encouragement, but we entirely accord in doctrine. We must be permitted to say, however, that this seems to be a concession on the part of Mr. C. very much at variance with his first principle, and entirely subversive of his doctrine in regard to the constitutionality of the measure, expressed in the *third*. It is a concession wrung from

\* We quote from the Report on Manufactures (page 212 Philada. edition.) "But though it were true that the immediate and certain effect of regulations controlling the competition of foreign with domestic fabrics was an increase of price, it is universally true that the contrary is the ultimate effect with every successful manufacture. When a domestic manufacture has attained to perfection, and has engaged in the prosecution of it a competent number of persons, it invariably becomes cheaper!"—"It can be afforded and accordingly seldom or never fails to be sold cheaper than was the foreign article for which it is a substitute."

him by the invincible testimony of the facts: one that, as an American and a statesman, he could not, in candor, withhold. There are some branches of our protected manufactures, that it would be the rashest folly and most culpable ignorance to say, have derived no benefit from the protective system of this country. Our plain cottons, Mr. C. is obliged to confess, form an exception to the evils enumerated in the train of our protective system—and it is too obvious for him, or any one else, to deny that our manufactures from leather, tin, copper, furs, and a host of other articles, have risen to a degree of prosperity that protects them forever from the competition of any rivals—not under the 5 and  $7\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. tariff of 1790—but under the 10, 15 and 30 per cent. tariffs of 1794, 1816, 1820 and 1824. If Mr. Cambreleng means to say that this is his free trade system—why, then, we shall hold it in more esteem. It is nearer in its resemblance to the free trade of Mr. Huskisson, and precisely in keeping with the free trade which, Mr. Cambreleng has shewn, worked such wonders in favour of our navigation, up to 1807. But, we must tell him, it is not the free trade of Adam Smith, the Edinburgh Review, and Mr. Ricardo—the short compend of whose doctrine is, “that the manufacture which can subsist without protection, does not want it, and that which cannot, does not deserve it.” He may quibble with us, perhaps, on the difference between *encouragement* and *protection*. As to the constitutional question, we can draw no distinction. If it be unlawful in Congress to *protect*, it is equally unlawful to *encourage*. The constitution does not deal with degrees: it gives all or none. But the distinction is equally futile in every other sense. To encourage our manufactures, you must protect them. The very encouragement is dependent upon the protection. No man will venture his capital into trade under the inducements furnished by the government for his encouragement, but with the guarantee of their protection. It would be a system of the most dishonourable and treacherous cruelty to extend encouragement on any other terms. It would be like encouraging our population to cultivate the Indian frontier, and deserting them upon the first incursion of the savages. It is a practical absurdity—a most pernicious sophism.

The *fourth, fifth and ninth* principles in the creed of Mr. Cambreleng, as we have stated them, fare no better than his first and second.

They stand in the like attitude of hostility. "The restraints on foreign commerce diminish the value of agricultural produce! and they increase the tide of emigration from the New England states to the west."

"Ours is essentially an agricultural people." And "we are as little of a manufacturing people now as we were at the adoption of the constitution!"

Mr. Cambreleng every where treats the protective system, as one destined to raise state monopolies—an odious taxing of the many for the benefit of the few—a plan to enrich one portion of the Union at the expense of the rest.—(See pages 11 and 12.) Now, if this be true, we would ask where do these monopolies exist? and of what character are they? If in the manufactures created by the protective system, how can they be *monopolies*, when Mr. C. tells us, they would have been more numerous and prosperous without the tariff, than with it? (page 6.) and that "we have been steadily sacrificing the commerce, navigation and capital of New England, merely to bring forward new competitors in manufacturing, to embarrass our old and skilful artizans, and to ruin themselves," (page 2.) If this be creating monopoly, it *looks* very much like the reverse. If discouraging manufactures by ruinous duties, and bringing new competitors into the field to contend against the old ones, be a monopolizing system, we have always been under a misapprehension of the terms.

This cry of monopoly is very stale, and quite unworthy the respectable character of Mr. Cambreleng's mind. There is no feature, as he himself has shown, of monopoly about it. There are no individuals nor companies invested with exclusive privileges. There are no over-grown capitals to frown down the attempts of the feeble. The field of competition is as open as the native atmosphere, and the results have been so far from those of a monopoly, that the well known cause of much of the present distress among our manufacturers, and the unquestionable source of that astonishing decline of prices, of which Mr. Cambreleng speaks, is

the extraordinary and unparalleled activity with which the ground of domestic manufacture has been occupied by artizans of all classes, degrees and size. Scarcely a mill seat has been found, in the last ten years, in those regions of our country suited to manufacturing, and especially in New England, that has not been seized upon by the greedy enterprize of our industrious manufacturers.\* Villages have sprung up under its influence: the waste has been turned into a garden; the unoccupied and profitless population of the country, have found labour and reward at their hands, and the most happy and joyous changes have occurred in the condition of thousands of helpless families. Whatever effect has resulted from the tariff policy, upon the success of the capitalist; however it may have trenched upon the established channels of commerce, there is but one opinion throughout the Union of the accumulated benefits it has dispensed upon our poorer population, and of the utter absence of any one consequence belonging to a monopoly. It is well enough that Adam Smith, and other European writers should inveigh against the monopolies with which they were conversant; against the mischiefs of old establishments, invested by royal charter with exclusive privileges, or guarded, with all the force of parchment, against the competition which has always proved so beneficial to the arts;—but it is very unbecoming an American statesman, and a philosopher, to press their sensible and well founded reproofs into a service that affords no one point of resemblance or application. Such an effort is as discreditable to the judgment of the man who makes it, as the argument, that because Great Britain can manufacture wool with a protection of 15 per cent. America can do it with 30!

But, there is one thing still more striking about this: why is it

\* It is somewhat remarkable, that the smaller manufacturing establishments in the United States, have suffered the least from the severe competition of the last year, and have *bent* before the storm that has *overwhelmed* sturdier antagonists. The difficulties of Connecticut, where there are, we believe, no large establishments, have been comparatively unfelt—and, generally, the moderate capitalists have at least saved themselves.

Manufactures are also making their way into the south. We understand that at this time an extensive cotton establishment is about removing from Delaware into South Carolina. There is more than one *Oasis*, too, in the anti-tariff desert of Virginia. Principles will travel with machinery.

that the population of New England should emigrate to the agricultural districts, with all the inducements of this monopoly to keep them at home? and that, when, as the chairman informs us, agricultural products are diminishing in value. The people of New England are charged with a disposition to fly to the agricultural districts at some thousand miles off, and to encounter all the privations of a country which has scarcely a market for any thing, and which pays double for every thing imported, at a time when agricultural products are diminishing in value, and to fly, too, from a quarter of the Union enjoying the exclusive privileges of monopoly? We insist upon it, Mr. C. must give us up the *reduction* in the value of agricultural product, the *monopoly*, or the *emigration*. We think inquiry will show that he is entitled to neither of them. As to the *monopoly*, Mr. C. cannot seriously urge it. The *emigration* from New England caused by the tariff, he has asserted with some emphasis, and has attempted to prove it by reference to the census. His argument upon this subject is as flimsy as a piece of Manchester cotton made to resemble American—as his own system fabricated after Mr. Huskisson's! It is this: The decline of population began with our restrictions in 1807. From 1790 to 1800, the increase in New England was 226,036: from 1800 to 1810, 239,883: from 1810 to 1820, 188,154: and up to 1828, 152,616. The *ratio*, he admits, might diminish, “but it is evident that the *amount* of the increase ought to have been greater in every succeeding ten years, instead of declining as it has done uniformly since 1807.” We presume that Mr. Cambreleng will not dispute with us the proposition, that a small population will increase in a greater ratio, though not in greater numbers, than a large. A man and his wife may contrive to double their population in two years, but he will be an active settler, and his wife as valuable a dame as the help-mate of Reuben Ring, in Cooper's romance, if he be as successful in the next two years; and nothing but a miracle could assist him in the third series. Mr. Cambreleng admits this, but he couples it with the remark, that “it is evident the *amount* ought to be greater in every succeeding ten years.” We would ask the learned chairman, in what state the amount has been greater in each succeeding ten years? We answer for him;—but one state in the *Union*, and that,

*Vermont.* In the last eight years, every state in the Union, with that exception, has been declining in ratio and amount: even the great states of Ohio and New York; and they, more than others, for the very reason that they are great states. Until the period assigned to the restrictions (1807,) we had no large new states;—the most of them were established after 1810. Since that time, about 300,000 square miles have been opened to emigration, and the population which has migrated thither has gone, principally, between 1810 and 1820, and at this time amounts to about 600,000. Now, the emigration has not been in a greater ratio from New England than from the other states: for New England has actually *increased* in population in a greater ratio than New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia and North Carolina, notwithstanding that her family is larger and more thickly settled; a circumstance that would, of course, lessen the ratio. The conclusion, therefore, from the census proves nothing, or it proves too much. It proves as much against the vigorous communities of Ohio and New York, as against New England; and yet no one will believe Mr. C. when he assures us that the population of these two states is suffering from the restraints on commerce.

The truth is, Mr. Cambreleng is altogether mistaken in imputing the common necessary emigration of New England, with her present dense population, to any cause connected with the tariff.—There is great reason to believe that more persons leave New England to pursue mechanick arts, than agriculture; and the most thriving manufacturing establishments, in the new states, will be found, generally, in the hands of the emigrants from New England. The western country is every year becoming a more comfortable region, and the inducements to emigration, therefore, are continually multiplying; as much in aid of the extension of the manufacturing system, as of the cultivation of the soil. If any thing has arrested this tide of emigration, it is to be found in the manufactures; the employment they have afforded, and the comforts they have dispensed, superseding, in a vast number of cases, the necessity of removal.\*

\* Indeed, Mr. Hayne has charged upon the New England states the encouragement of the protective system, with this very purpose of repressing emigration to the west.—(See his last speech.) The professors disagree!

To say "that ours is essentially an agricultural people," is an unmeaning generality. We are essentially whatever the occasion makes us; bent by no national habitudes to any particular species of labour, but remarkable, throughout the world, for our facile and dexterous versatility in any calling;—and there never was a nation so well fitted to raise themselves out of that class which Smith and Say, both, denominate the *beggarly countries*; countries addicted to agriculture, and dependent upon foreigners. But Mr. C. who is fated to afford every variety of self contradiction, and whose report is "compact of jars" to a degree that we have never seen in the most hurried performance, is not consistent even in this simple declaration. It suits his argument, more than once, to represent us in another light. We are sometimes naturally a commercial country, (p. 21.) And again; we are a people of such strong propensity for manufacturing, as even prematurely to engage in it. (p. 6)

We think, however, that we have said enough to show that Mr. Cambreleng is entitled neither to the emigration of New England, nor to the *monopoly*, in his argument against the tariff; and, it would seem, that he has as little claim to set down the *diminution in the value* of agricultural products to that source. Indeed, his own argument upon emigration, ought to have solved that problem for him. The cotton planters have about the same sort of monopoly that the manufacturers have; and the consequences have been exactly the same. Nature has imposed her protection on the product; and the monopolists have increased so rapidly, that the competition has furnished a tenfold supply. Upwards of one hundred thousand square miles of land have been opened to the planters, and the quantity of the material has increased from about 20,000,000 of pounds in 1800, to 294,000,000 in 1827. As it is the natural tendency of all competition to bring down price, we have at once a short explanation of the diminution of value of which Mr. Cambreleng speaks. It is needless to look beyond this cause, for it is entirely adequate to the effect; and it does seem to us to argue a perversity of prejudice, to travel to so remote and uncertain a source as the supposed unfriendliness of the protective system to population, to escape so simple a conclusion. Indeed, to our conceptions, it seems particularly unfortunate in the argument, because we

could not imagine any device better calculated to prevent this over-stocking of the agricultural class than the manufacturing system, and, especially, that kind of manufacture which consumes, in immense quantities, this very product. All the economists argue strongly in favour of manufactures,—none more than Adam Smith,—from their admirable adaptation to consume the accumulations of agriculture.\* The only question they have entertained was, whether manufactures will not grow better without protection than with it, but, of the importance of their growth, and their singularly prosperous influence upon a home market, we do not remember ever to have read a dissenting opinion. We take it for granted, that Mr. C. himself, has no disposition to controvert this point with us,—and that he would rather endeavour to make good his case by asserting, that there were actually no manufactures in New England. He firmly believes, that our manufactures have not grown up under the influence of the tariff; but, in fact, have been rather repressed and hindred by it. When he proves this point to the satisfaction of one intelligent friend, on his own side of the question, we shall, perhaps, examine his documents, and attempt to entertain him with some further extracts from the report, upon the injury done to commerce, by the immense diversion of capital into new channels of industry;—upon his horror of monopolies, and other matter connected therewith. For the present, we will e'en

\* Smith and Say both descent upon the value of manufactures, as essential to the prosperity and greatness of a nation. They in common with other economists, agree in calling the manufacturing, the rich nations, and the agricultural the poor. Even, Dr. Cooper, (in his speech at Columbia, July, 1827,) does homage to the great importance of this interest, and its claims to encouragement and protection. We will spare the Doctor, any reference to his commendations of the restrictive system in 1813. He has repented of that, and sung his palinode. We cannot say we are sorry for it.

Adam Smith goes farther upon this subject than is generally believed of him: as the following extract will show.

"From the beginning of the reign of Elizabeth, too, the English Legislature has been peculiarly attentive to the interests of commerce and manufactures; and, in reality, there is no country in Europe, Holland itself, not excepted, of which the law is, upon the whole, more favourable to this sort of industry."—*Wealth of Nations, Hartford Edition*, p. 325.

What country has been more severe in restrictions than England or Holland?

rest in the faith that there are *some few* manufacturing establishments erected in the United States;—and that they do consume *some* portions of cotton, of grain, and other agricultural products. Lord Peter shall never persuade us that bread is any thing but bread!

We, therefore, dismiss this branch of the report, and take the liberty to say that we presume the learned chairman means *merely to be pleasant*, when he tells us that “ notwithstanding all our legislation, we are as little of a manufacturing people now, as we were at the adoption of the Constitution!!!”

Upon the *sixth* proposition Mr. C. has made a display worthy of himself and his subject. If we had not already become familiar with the cast of his mind, we should stand aghast with his deductions upon this point. It presents one of the most tremendous explosions of opinion that has ever burst upon the people of this land. The worthy chairman has fairly wrought himself up into the true Munchausen vein, when he descants upon the vigour of our contraband trade. It is impossible, he tells us, “to measure the extent of a trade, the existence of which depends on secrecy and despatch; but we may form some opinion of its growth, by contrasting our present duties, revenue, and population, with those which existed more than twenty years ago. Under our former moderate duties, the nett revenue from customs had risen to sixteen millions annually. The ten preceding years, from 1818 to 1827 inclusive, averaged about eighteen millions annually, although we had, in the meantime, doubled our population and our duties. Had our consumption continued to increase, even in a ratio to our population, and had our high duties been enforced instead of eighteen, we ought now to have collected an annual revenue of forty or fifty millions.” (page 26.) From all which, he has brought himself to the modest conviction, that our smuggling at present, strips the revenue of, about **TWENTY OR THIRTY MILLIONS** annually!!!—Bravo! And all this from the tariff. The country owes her everlasting gratitude to Mr. Cambreleng, for this valuable discovery.

Not to be behind hand with him in zeal to open the eyes of our countrymen, we shall improve upon the hint he has given us, and endeavour to construct a table to show the amount that has been smuggled into the United States: taking his \$16,000,000 of customs in 1807 as zero; and rising with the population.

In 1818 the customs amounted to      The smuggling was  
upwards of 17 millions. then about 8 millions.

1819	-	-	-	20	"	-	-	6	"
1820	-	-	-	15	"	-	-	12	"
1821	-	-	-	13	"	-	-	15	"
1822	-	-	-	17	"	-	-	13	"
1823	-	-	-	19	"	-	-	14	"
1824	-	-	-	17	"	-	-	17	"
1825	-	-	-	20	"	-	-	16	"
1826	-	-	-	23	"	-	-	15	"
1827	-	-	-	19	"	-	-	20	"
1828	-	-	-	23	"	-	-	16	"

Total in 11 years, - - - - - 152

The Exchequer robbed of one hundred and fifty-two millions since 1818! What a lesson for the enthusiasts upon republican virtue! What an exhibition of mercantile patriotism! What a commentary upon a custom-house oath! And, above all, what a magnificent idea for Mr. Cambreleng's brain! And yet, with this awful display before him, the worthy chairman is of opinion, (after Mr. Huskisson) that a maximum duty of thirty per cent. ad valorem, has been ascertained to be, "after centuries of experience—the safest for the revenue, and the best for manufactures." (p. 38.) Why sir, the duties up to 1824 were not even as high, in most cases, as 30 per cent.; and yet, in the seven years under those rates, it seems, (upon the authority of the Committee) that we smuggled with as keen a relish as we have ever done since. There were up to that period 95,000,000, unlawfully purloined from the Treasury! And what must have been the amount of merchandise thus surreptitiously introduced. In 1825 the imports were valued at \$96,000,000: and that sum only yielded 20,000,000 of customs. At this rate the 95,000,000, out of which the government was defrauded, in the seven years of thirty per cent. duties, must have represented merchandise to the value of —— let us see: If 20 give 96, what will 95 give?—four hundred and forty three millions of dollars! And the whole 152 give us seven hundred and twenty-two millions of dollars worth of goods let into the country in eleven years by stealth! It is, really, time to change our system!

But, what is remarkable about it, the tariff of 1824 made but little difference in this rapacious and lawless spirit;—the smuggling for the next two years being, even, less than before. What an amount of tonnage must have been employed in this illicit trade!—Nearly equal to that engaged in the lawful trade: and, yet, scarcely a ton of it registered:—for Mr. Cambreleng shows us that in 1807 our foreign tonnage was 1,089,876 while in 1827 it was 900,-199. Consequently, all the balance of tonnage necessary for this immense smuggling trade—greater in 1827 than the lawful—must have been in *unregistered* vessels, either of our own, or foreign construction, something like 900,000 tons of secreted shipping!—Verily, Mr. C. says true, “we have vast and imaginary boundaries,”—and some vast and imaginary statements! But Mr. C. claims a deduction for diminished consumption. He insists that the protective system of this country has curtailed the supplies of the people—nay, he goes farther and affirms that it has particularly oppressed the poorer classes; that the consumption, in fact, has been growing less, ever since the era of restrictions. Yet, with his usual blindness to inconsistent averments, he tells us (page 5, 6) that the system of restrictions “has derived some degree of popularity from the reduction of prices”—that “every year our wants have been supplied at a cheaper rate,”—and that, “it is impossible to anticipate, should the peace continue, to what minimum rates prices may be reduced.” With this admission, what becomes of his diminished consumption? It is against every theory of political economy to suppose that consumption can diminish under this accelerated and continuing depression of prices, and, much less rational is it to suppose, that smuggling could prevail, to any extent, under such a state of things. Mr. Cambreleng must either assume an *increase* of prices, or abandon his *diminished consumption*,—and thus leave his smuggling trade unmitigated by that circumstance,—or else abandon his *smuggling* altogether. There could not be woven together a tissue of greater absurdities. The things are quite incompatible.

But the friends of free trade have ever been remarkable for the most incorrigible obliquity of argument. They never fail to overleap the plain and obvious conclusions presented by facts, for the

sake of some remote, ungenial deduction, which the facts never warrant, and which is sure even to bring them into a state of direct opposition. They can see the wonderful decline of prices, but they will neither understand their *cause* nor *effect*. The question is, really, a very clear one. The *cause* of the fall of prices has been, most obviously, the competition both at home and abroad.—The restrictive system has built up manufactures at home: these have not only entered into a brisk competition with each other, but they have excited emulation abroad to underwork them,—both in foreign markets, to which we export our manufactures, and in our own markets notwithstanding the duty. The *effect* has been continual reduction of price;—the very consequence attributed to this competition by Genl. Hamilton, and predicted, uniformly, by the friends of protection in the United States. Without our domestic manufactures this result never could have taken place. The British, having possession of the market, would never have reduced their prices below the effects of their own competition. So that, whether we could *now* get our supplies cheaper in England than formerly, or not,—it is very evident that, but for our protective system, we never could have done so; and that as soon as we should be exposed again to the full sweep of the British capital, undisturbed by our home competition, we should have the prices up again to the old standard.\* The consumer, therefore, in this country has

\* The British are now prepared to make any sacrifices to ruin our establishments. A few years of reduced prices, would subject them to a loss which the government would willingly incur, if it would break up our manufactures, because, released from the competition, they could indemnify themselves by the command of prices which they would thus ensure in an uninterrupted market. Such a policy is not new to British ministers. We take the liberty to make the following extract from a pamphlet published by Mr. Geo. Tibbitts of New York, in 1829,—(to which we beg leave to refer our readers as one of the best expositions of the protective policy that we have seen.) "It was known, when the markets in Europe were shut against England, by the decrees of Bonaparte, that the English government formed an establishment on the little barren island of Heligoland, near the mouth of the Elbe, as a depot and place from which goods could be readily got on to the continent, and from which large quantities of goods found their way from England to the continent. It was known, also, that the English government sent large sums of money to the continent as subsidies to the powers in their interest, which

profited, and must continue to profit by the measure. Mr. Cambreleng may gravely assure us of the diminished consumption, but who can believe him? Does it not excite a smile to hear an observant American statesman tell us, at this day, that we consume less than we did ten years ago? Was there ever a fact more open to the contradiction of the senses? There is not a labourer, perhaps, in our country, that does not wear two shirts now, where he wore one at that time:—the increasing comforts of the country are marvellous to all observation: our citizens are better clothed, better fed, and more steadily employed in industrious pursuits than they ever were before. It is true, that a certain class of merchants do not get the same extravagant profits on capital, but every other interest in the country has been brought nearer to an equality of comfort with them. This fact is sufficient, of itself, to illustrate Mr. Cambreleng's zeal, and opens the whole secret of the applauding fervours of Gotham. We regard it, however, as a consummation full of splendid realities, working its miracles amongst our people with a notoriety that cannot escape even the prejudiced observation of Mr. Cambreleng himself. It is in vain to say that this process of reduction in price has been the ordinary settling down of war rates to rates of peace. The process has not even followed the successive operations of that cause. The fall did not commence immediately after the peace; it came almost *per saltum*, upon our protecting duties. The tariff of sixteen did but little for it; the tariff of twenty four acted like a charm. But what does Mr. Cambreleng

cramped their metallic circulation, at times very much. But it has, but lately, been generally known, that to get this money back, and keep every thing quiet at home, goods, to large amounts, were sent to the continent *at the instance of government who guaranteed the adventures, against loss of every kind*; which cost the government millions." p. 27.

Even, without the aid of government: the manufacturers of Great Britain would be content to spend something to *run us down*, if they were sure of success. It is the spirit of trade. We have now an exemplification of it, in the "Old" and "Opposition" lines of coaches, from this to Washington. The "old line" are running below cost, in hopes to drive the "opposition yankees" off the field. No one doubts, how the "old" will reimburse itself, if they succeed. At the present time the prices, like Mr. Cambreleng's, have "declined astonishingly."

leng mean by "the salutary influence of peace on the labours of mankind," if he does not include in it, the very competition of which we have been speaking? And will he be so bold as to deny that our protective system has given rise to no competition, plainly ascribable to itself? If he does, how will he account for the fact that in 1820 we exported but two millions worth of domestic manufactures, and that in 1827 we exported the value of six millions and a half, when the prices had fallen to less than 50 per cent. upon their value in 1820? Does this fact speak nothing in favour of our protective system, and its effect upon foreign competition? Has it excited no emulation on the part of our English rivals? Have they had no fears of the American manufactures, which could thus gain a footing in foreign parts where they met upon terms of perfect equality?\* Have they been silent about the influence of the protective system? Or have they not given forth the usual diagnosticks of their irritated nervous habit, in reduplicated efforts to persuade us of the value of *free trade*, and the policy of dismissing our system?—the most certain index that Great Britain ever affords of her dread of the consequences. Under all these circumstances can we be so blind as to take the bait?

We should say, there are motives to distrust Mr. Cambreleng, and his friends, sufficiently strong to refuse his evidence, on the subject, altogether. We cannot place confidence in the judgment of one so singularly hoodwinked as to facts. The interest which he represents, the tone in which he represents it, and the fatal delusions of his philosophy, are sufficient to discredit him as a witness. The factor part of the City of New York, have a very perceptible interest to persuade us to take every thing across the Atlantic, and

\* We are unable to furnish the history of the negotiations between Great Britain and the government of Buenos Ayres, and other powers in South America, some two or three years back. But their import is well understood. The fear of American competition there, has been something more than an idle vision. These things will come to light in good time. Even now the British cottons, in that quarter, owe their currency to fraud. They are flimsy imitations of substantial American wares,—bearing counterfeit marks. In the way of fair trade, it is seen that our manufactures are able to keep their ground even against this competition.

bring every thing back. It is like the infatuation of the back men and boat-blacks of Washington, to pray continually for foul weather. "Your cursed fine days" set people to using their own resources; they break up the carriage hire, and the cleaning. The protective system encourages American, instead of English labour, and, of course, the carrier and his agents, between America and Great Britain are the losers. Its effect upon the regular, substantial merchant of the country is just the reverse: it expands his means, multiplies his products, increases his adventure, and bears his flag to the uttermost parts of the earth.

We think we have said enough to show that the reduction of protection is nothing more than the legitimate effect of our system. It is the effect foretold by the friends of the tariff, and denied *a priori* by its enemies. Both parties have appealed to time as the arbiter. And time has given it in our favour. The free trade politicians foretold, and Mr. C. still repeats the engury, that every thing was to give in salvo. We think it unphilosophical, or at least, a very suspicious symptom of weakness, to ascribe predicted consequences, after they have arrived, to any other than the causes counted on by those who prophesied; and, much more so, when the predictions were manifold and particular; and when they who deny the connection between the cause and effect, can only account for the contingency, by strained, far-fetched, and unintelligible conjectures. But whether they be right or wrong, in their philosophy, all agree that the prices, as Mr. C. asserts, have declined astonishingly since the war; and that being the case, the stupendous vision of unlawful trade which has disturbed the dreams of Mr. Cambraieng, must fit why to join the other maddest creations of the dreamers fancy, in that unvisited realm of fairy wonders, where the free trade system flourishes in pure and immensurable luxuriance—and where alone it flourishes.

Our next concern is with Mr. Cambraieng's picture of our navigation. The second preposition in our list affirms, what the reader will find sedulously insinuated throughout the report, that the protective system is destructive to our navigation; that it has reduced our shipping below what it was in 1801; and that, by contrasting its present and past condition, "we shall learn to feel no small degree

of alarm, lest our fatal restrictions should have already driven us too far in the rear of all our rivals for national power and naval ascendancy." (page 18.)

In the argument which we propose to hold with Mr. Cambreleng on this subject, we give him warning that we do not mean to take advantage of his great commercial marine employed in his smuggling operations; but we would respectfully suggest to the learned chairman, as some relief to his solicitude for our naval ascendancy, that he has furnished us a brilliant school for our navy in these stormy and midnight adventures on the coast: the very best training that we could imagine to make brave, and wily seamen for the wars. It has a high Spartan smack after the best fashion of Lycus-gus. But as it would be ungenerous—not to say cruel, in us to use these forces against the very author of their being, we shall even confine ourselves to the records of the Custom-house.

Mr. Cambreleng, in this branch of his argument, is reduced to great distress. His case absolutely requires a *destruction* of our navigation. It is a *sine qua non* to his success, and make it out he must, at all hazards—if not *totidem verbis*,—then *totidem syllabis*;—for his whole scheme of vituperation would be undermined, if it should, unfortunately, turn out that our navigation was in a prosperous way. It is like Shakespeare's being obliged to kill Mercutio; best Mercutio, should kill him. Never was the triumph of arithmetic more complete, than in the hands of our worthy chairman! He has succeeded after a laborious search and many trials, through a maze of figures, in finding the exact proportions he desired. The discovery has done wonders; he is even astonished at his own conclusions.—He knew the thing was bad enough, but he was not prepared for such a charming list of horrors as he has brought to light.

In the first place, insisting upon it, that the free trade system prevailed up to the year 1807, it was useful to shew, that up to this period, the influence of this system had worked miracles in favor of the navigation. He therefore tells us, that our foreign tonnage had risen from 127,929 tons in 1789 to 1,089,876 in 1807, a clear increase of 962,547 tons in 19 years. Now, the common opinion has been that the free trade system had nothing to do with this.

on the contrary, there are shrewd doubts amongst the professors themselves, whether there was, in fact, at that time, what might be entitled free trade, at all;—whether our discriminating duties and tonnage, upon which we have already commented, were not part and parcel of our very protective system. We think, decidedly, that there was the true protective principle in it; and so do our friends on the other side of the Atlantic. But waiving that, there was a still more potent cause which Mr. C. is equally bound to disparage. The foreign wars and our neutrality threw upon us the carrying trade of Europe; and the impression has been universal, amongst the best informed persons in the United States, that our navigation owed much of its success to that fact. But this, it seems, is not true.... It was a stumbling block in the way of Mr. Cambreleng's argument, and he demolishes it with a flat rebuke upon the folly of such a notion:—"those who think so, take but a superficial view of the causes which gave a strong impulse to our navigation at that early period."—"Our navigation"—he continues—"grew more rapidly before the continental war, when we had nothing to carry but our own produce, than it did at any period afterwards. In three years from 1789 to '92 the increase was near 300,000 tons: from 1792 to '96 it ought to have increased a greater amount, but it was not much over 200,000 tons, showing clearly a more rapid increase, both in ratio and amount, before than after the war broke out."—(page 19.) Such is the short summary by which Mr. C. persuades himself that he is able to overthrow the established opinions of the whole nation, fortified by the most irresistible documentary evidence, as well as by the personal observation and experience of our citizens, in regard to the extent of the carrying trade. Independent of all aid derived from our tonnage returns, the statement of our exports is conclusive upon the subject. The value of our whole exports, in the year ending September, 1790, was \$20,205,156: in 1791, it was \$19,012,044; in 1792 it was \$20,753,098. In 1796 our exports of foreign merchandize alone, were \$26,800,000; in 1800, they were \$39,130,877; in 1805, they were \$53,179,019; in 1806 they were \$60,283,236; in 1807 they were \$59,643,558. Whilst in 1818, our foreign exports amounted to \$19,426,696; in 1820, to \$18,008,029; in 1824, to \$25,897,157; and in 1827, to \$23,403,156. This statement

furnishes the most satisfactory evidence as to the condition of the carrying trade, which began about 1796, and ended with our war restrictions. The amount of these exports, of articles the growth of foreign countries, shows the extent of the trade which the United States carried on for other nations. In the note below, we have given a table of these exports, as compared with the domestic exports, which will show, at once, the fallacy of Mr. Cambreleng's argument. But we have to charge him with a still greater inaccuracy on this point. He would have us believe, that the tonnage of the United States increased from 1789 to 1792 by near 300,000 tons. His misrepresentation in this matter is of an eager and absurd aspect. We are scarcely willing to save his veracity by the sacrifice which it compels us to make of his judgment. In 1789 our registered tonnage, according to Mr. C.—was 127,329 tons; in 1790 it was 354,767; an increase in one year of 227,436. Now does not this very increase show, that in the first year of the government but little more than one third of our existing tonnage had been registered? Is Mr. C. so infatuated with his own conclusions, as to believe that this increase was new tonnage? The augmentation for the next year was but 8,895 tons, and of the year following, 51,017 tons. Why did not the increase of the next two years hold some

\* Statement showing the estimated value of the domestic and foreign merchandise annually exported from the United States to foreign countries.

	Articles the growth, produce, or manufacture of the U. States.	Articles of foreign growth, produce, or manufacture.	Total value of articles produced, or manufactured.
1800	\$31,846,903	\$39,130,877	\$70,971,780
1801	47,473,204	46,642,731	94,115,925
1802	36,708,189	35,774,971	72,483,160
1803	42,205,961	13,594,072	55,800,033
1804	41,467,477	36,931,597	77,699,074
1805	42,387,002	53,179,019	95,566,021
1806	41,953,727	60,283,936	101,536,663
1807	48,699,592	59,643,558	108,343,150
1818	73,854,437	19,426,696	93,281,133
1819	50,976,638	19,165,683	70,142,521
1820	51,683,640	18,008,029	69,691,669
1821	43,671,894	21,302,488	64,974,382
1822	49,874,079	22,986,286	72,160,281
1823	47,155,409	27,543,202	74,699,030
1824	50,649,508	25,337,157	75,986,657
1825	66,944,745	32,590,643	99,535,388
1826	53,055,710	24,539,612	77,595,322
1827	58,921,691	22,403,135	80,324,827

proportion to the first. It is almost incredible that any intelligent writer could make such a mistake. And yet upon this frail foundation Mr. C. has ventured to erect an argument, the import of which is, to charge all men with superficial views of the subject who could not see with his eyes the strength he attaches to so flimsy a statement. The probability is, that the increase of the tonnage, in the first year, was very little above that in the second; while the enormous and increasing amounts of foreign merchandize exported in American vessels, after 1798 manifest the vigor of the carrying trade, and give Mr. C's remote speculations and fantastic notions upon the influence of unrestricted commerce to the winds:

As connected with this error Mr. C. attempts to alarm us with another conclusion: "the mere increase of our foreign tonnage, prior to 1807, exceeds the whole amount of our navigation, now employed in our intercourse between the whole Union and all nations, nearly 150,000 tons." (page 18.)

Although his phrase is ambiguous, Mr. C. means to assert that the increase in our foreign tonnage, in those years exceeded by 150,000 tons, our present foreign tonnage. There is nothing wonderful in the fact if it were true,---for if our tonnage had been nothing in the first year of the government, then its increase in every subsequent year would have been equal to the whole amount of tonnage in that year;---and Mr. C. has lent his aid to make it as near to nothing as he could. It is much more astonishing that the increase of the tonnage in the first year of the government, if Mr. C's calculation were true, was greater, both in ratio and amount, than it has been in any year since. And yet the chairman has overlooked this singular fact altogether. If he had seen it, he would, at once, have discovered that the returns of 1789 did not show the actual amount of shipping for that year. This however proves nothing, but what never was denied, namely, that our tonnage increased very rapidly up to 1807, and the more rapidly during those years in which we enjoyed our immense neutral trade.

Mr. Cambreleng goes on to tell us, that "while our navigation has remained, *at best, stationary*, that of our rival has advanced, from 1815 to 1837, 761,940 tons;---the mere increase alone in British foreign navigation, amounting nearly to the whole foreign

tonnage of the United States." (page 21.) And this, he attributes to the fact "that while Great Britain has retrograded from prohibitory to moderate duties, we have been substituting restrictions for free trade."

If upon an investigation of the fact, it should appear that British navigation so far from increasing has actually declined, and, on the other hand, that our navigation has been thriving, we take it for granted, that Mr. Cambreleng will not object to our making advantage of the principle which he has put to this test, and will be content to allow that this decline, on the one side, and improvement on the other, are the fair and legitimate consequences of that "simultaneous change in the policy of the two nations," to which he refers. We shall hold him to this admission, although we do not bind ourselves to admit what we do not believe—that Great Britain has advanced one step towards a *free trade* system.

In support of his position Mr. Cambreleng has overwhelmed us with figures. We shall give these an attentive examination, and offer a few of our own in return. To prove that our navigation has remained, *at best, stationary*, he has given us a table of American shipping (registered and enrolled) for each year up to 1828.—As his remarks do not apply to the period up to 1807, we shall confine our view to the tonnage employed in *foreign trade*, since 1815. By Mr. C's own table, No. 4,—the correctness of which we shall have occasion hereafter to dispute—it will appear that the average annual tonnage from 1815 to 1820, inclusive, is 783,021 tons, whilst the annual average from 1821 to 1828 is 836,398 tons,—an excess of 53,377 tons in favor of each year of the latter period: And of the eight years from 1821 to 1828, inclusive, the increase in the annual average tonnage of the four last years over the four former, are 88,266 tons. This is what Mr. Cambreleng calls *remaining at best, but stationary*.

Mr. Cambreleng, however, has been guilty of a deception, which whether it springs from ignorance or from design, is equally discreditable to his argument. In his note to his table No. 4, he has told us that the registry of tonnage was corrected in 1818. The registry up to that period, contained many vessels that had been lost, rotted away, or sold, and in that year these were ascertained, and a

corrected registry was made. This corrected list ought to have been furnished. But Mr. C. chose only to give us the old list with all its errors. The new one would have presented an entirely different case.\* It would have shown a steady increase in the tonnage every year since that period. It will remain for Mr. Cambreleng, and the committee to explain with what views this misrepresentation has been promulgated.

There is a record of the registers granted, and another of the tonnage entering and departing from the United States in each year. If instead of looking at the *registered* tonnage Mr. C. had looked at the tonnage *arriving* and *departing* in the same periods, he would also have found an increase in our navigation. In order therefore to supply, what Mr. Cambreleng seems carefully to have concealed, we have annexed a table showing the amount of American tonnage

\* We give this list from Watterson and Van Zandt's tables.

In 1818 the registered tonnage amounted to	606,088 tons
1819	612,930
1820	619,047
1821	619,896
1822	628,150
1823	639,920
1824	669,972
1825	700,788
1826	737,978
1827	766,963
1828	812,619

This statement shows an increase of American registered tonnage of 206,531 tons in 11 years. Mr. Cambreleng has asserted, upon the faith of a table that he knew to be untrue, that our tonnage has decreased, since 1818, by 52,781 tons.

entering and departing from the United States since 1821.\* There having been no note taken of the departing tonnage until 1820, we are unable to give the comparison in a former period. This statement, however, will manifest what dependence is to be placed upon the assertion that our navigation is, at the best but stationary. In every view it is worthy of remark, that the tonnage has increased in a more rapid ratio since 1824, than before, and in the year 1827 was but little short of the amount employed by the United States in that most prosperous period when we enjoyed, almost exclusively, the commerce of Europe; and shewing, we think very conspicuously, how far from hostile the restrictive system has been to our trade. We have framed the table last referred to, with reference to another view, in which we wish to present this question of commerce and navigation to our readers. Our foreign trade is to be measured by the tonnage employed in its transportation, *whether in our own, or foreign shipping.* We have therefore given the foreign tonnage engaged in American trade and the aggregate of that and our own,

\* Table showing the tonnage entering and departing from the United States, and also showing the aggregate of foreign and American tonnage employed in our trade.

	American ves- sels entering.	American ves- sels depart- ing.	Foreign ves- sels entering.	Foreign ves- sels depart- ing.	Aggregate of American & foreign ves- sels enter- ing.	Aggregate of American & foreign ves- sels depart- ing.
1821	765,098	804,947	81,526	83,073	846,634	888,099
1822	787,961	813,748	100,541	97,490	888,502	911,238
1823	775,271	810,761	119,468	119,740	894,739	930,501
1824	850,023	919,278	102,367	102,552	952,400	1,021,830
1825	880,754	960,366	92,927	95,080	973,681	1,055,446
1826	942,206	953,012	105,654	99,417	1,047,880	1,058,439
1827	918,361	980,542	137,589	131,250	1,055,950	1,111,699
1828	868,381	897,404	150,223	151,030	1,018,604	1,048,434
					7,678,360	8,019,690
1800	682,871		122,403		805,274	
1801	849,302		157,270		1,006,572	
1802	798,805		145,519		944,324	
1803	787,424		163,714		951,138	
1804	821,962		122,141		944,103	
1805	922,298		87,842		1,010,130	
1806	1,044,005		90,984		1,134,989	
1807	1,089,876		86,780		1,176,656	
					7,973,206	

The departing tonnage of this latter period is not furnished.

from the year 1800 to 1807, and from 1821 to 1828. The whole amount thus employed in the first eight years is 7,973,296 tons. In the latter period it is 7,878,360 tons, both computed of the *tonnage entering*. The aggregate of the tonnage departing, during the last period, is 8,019,690 tons. This affords a fair exhibit of the American shipping when engaged under circumstances of the most extraordinary advantage to trade, and subsequently, when it had to contend against a world at peace, and all the competition of foreign nations struggling to gain an ascendancy for their marine. This comparison, certainly, presents any thing but a declining state of trade, and wholly discredits the puerile and melancholy deductions of Mr. Cambreleng. When it is understood further,—what is affirmed upon the most respectable authority,—"that our tonnage, of late years, is rated at less than its actual capacity, from some difference in the mode of constructing our ships, there is ground to believe that our tonnage at this period is even greater in amount than it ever was before."

But, it is not to our foreign tonnage alone, that we must look to settle this question. Our coasting tonnage is quite as important in our view, in a discussion of the effects of our policy upon our navigation. It is in many respects a more valuable branch of our marine than the former. It is more within our control; equally good as a nursery for our seamen, and of the most essential benefit in the administration of our manufacturing system at home. We can guard and protect it against outward injury and foster it, when our foreign channels of commerce are cut off.

This tonnage has increased at a steady pace, even when Mr. C. alleges that our foreign tonnage has been declining; although he would have us believe "that they uniformly rise and decline together" (page 20.)—to contradict which assertion we have only

\* Some intelligent merchants and ship owners have estimated the difference at 40 or 50 per cent, and others still higher. It is said to be not uncommon for a ship rated at 300 tons to carry a cargo of 450, or 500 tons.

to refer to its increase even up to the period of the war.\* It is to be observed in reference to it, that this tonnage, as Mr. Cambreleng's table No. 4, demonstrates, has increased, since the restrictions of 1824 both in a greater ratio and amount than it ever did before. It is peculiarly affected by the protective system, and from its occupation must necessarily thrive with the extension of our manufactures.

In treating upon this subject, Mr. C. is ludicrously at fault. He is puzzled at every turn with his own documents. Dr. Syntax in search of the picturesque, had not more calls upon his fancy, to make up his sketch, than the labouring Atlas of the free trade cause, in this his emergency. But he has a faith that will remove mountains, and a perseverance that is never to be daunted.

He has looked at the thing in every light; turned the tables upside down; counted the figures backwards, and tried the question through all the categories. 'The tables are all lies,' quoth the chairman—'The conclusion cannot be got out *collective*—so, we will try it *confusé et distributively*,'—said he.

Although the returns show an increase, he assures us that, "unfortunately, it is only in appearance" (page 18.). We doubt his sincerity in that "unfortunately"—Right glad would he be if this obstinate coasting trade had never increased a ton! But we will hear his account of the matter. "It grows out of additions to our territory," and our steam boats on the lakes, the Mississippi, Mis-

\* In fact the enrolments were more numerous, during the war, than in 1807, as will be seen by reference to Seybert's Statistics, page 317. We give the entries of those periods.

1807	318,189 tons.
1808	387,684
1809	371,500
1810	371,114
1811	386,258
1812	442,180
1813	422,404
1814	495,713

These entries show no fixed proportion whatever with the registered tonnage.

"ouri and Ohio," and "out of" our coasting trade with Florida and Louisiana." But that does not reduce it enough; so he gives us a residuary clause to cover the balance,—"and a portion of it is merely nominal." Is it not wonderful that our coasting trade should increase with our territory? And that our tonnage should be enlarged by the coasting trade with Florida and Louisiana? We are surprised that the learned chairman did not also aver, that it had unfairly increased, with our population. Indeed, he does say as much,—"a just and accurate statement, if it could be made in 1828 of the tonnage in the same commercial circle which existed in 1807, would show an actual decline since the war!" Possibly enough. And carry the calculation a little farther,—if it could now be ascertained what had become of our coasting vessels employed in 1807, there is good ground to think that they are all rotten,—a total decline! It is upon the increase of our commercial circle, and our population, and our new business, with the multitude of new matters which make up the political aspect of 1828, that we expected to find an increase of tonnage:—But what part of it is *merely nominal*? Mr. C. has attempted, in a note to his table No. 4, to give us some explanation of this—but to us it is utterly unintelligible. It is a round assertion that the tables are not correct: that there are 277,804 tons of the registered shipping of 1828 included in the coasting tonnage; that the registered tonnage was corrected in 1818 and 200,000 tons were struck out of that list; and supposing that the error in the coasting tonnage was only half that amount, then it follows that the whole amount is reduced from 881,605 down to 503,605;—and then deduct something else;—and then suppose another supposition,—and then it results, in the grand conclusion, that we have actually less enrolled and licensed tonnage now than we had in 1807! Admirable reasoning! Here let arithmeticians and statesmen come to study the edifying process by which 500,000 tons of substantial shipping paying its yearly stipend to the government, may be reduced to a fraction below nothing! Here let Congress learn the efficacy of Dr. Doubt's philosophy, and, from this time forward, let no man say "it is, but it *seems to be*!"

Before, however, we bend under this all-prostrating blast of suppositions, we beg to hold some further discourse with the chairman.

He affirms that, from 1789 to 1807 our coasting tonnage increased 342,573 tons. Upon examining his table No. 4, we find that he states the tonnage of 1789 at 77,669, (which by the by, is obnoxious to the same remark as the registered tonnage of that year, namely, that it exhibits not more than one half of the *actual* tonnage, as the return for the next year, — 132,125 tons — will show), — while the tonnage of 1807 is set down by him at 360,834. Now the difference between these is 283,165. How does Mr. C. make his 342,573? — He does not tell us the process by which this is effected, but he is obviously playing off some arithmetical juggle upon us again, and, what is very remarkable, the same tables which are too good for the era of restrictions, and which exaggerate the state of things hideously, when they war against his theory, are, really, not bold enough for him to get along with in his free trade era. Were there no mistakes in the tonnage returns previous to 1807? no registered tonnage ranked in that list? no deductions to be made of any sort? This is a vexatious inquiry, and we would entreat the learned chairman to edify us.

There is one fact that we think ought to have struck, even the obtuse prejudices of Mr. C. hard enough to have been felt by him, in making up his calculations. If the mixture of foreign tonnage with the coasting was a matter to disturb the computations for 1828, how does it happen that this tonnage in 1827 was 868,171, and in 1826, 798,815 tons, and why has it gone on regularly increasing every year? This can only be accounted for by the supposition, that in every year the coasting has its due proportion of registered tonnage mixed with it, and, consequently, that circumstance does not effect the ratio of the increase. No one has ever supposed that our coasting trade was carried on by vessels which were not sometimes employed in foreign trade, but, undoubtedly, the coasting trade is as vigorous and improving, in the one aspect, as in the other. This circumstance might be good to show that the aggregate returns of our coasting and foreign tonnage did not accurately show the number of tons of American shipping, but it can have no sort of bearing on the question of the relative increase of either. When we come to speak of Mr. Cambreleng's views of British navigation, we shall show of how little moment he deems

the intermingling of coasting and foreign tonnage, where his purpose is to fabricate an argument against us.

There is still another remark to be made upon his statement in reference to this matter. He affects to undervalue the treasury returns of the coasting tonnage at this time, by telling us that when commerce is active as it was in 1807, "some reliance may be placed on the tables of coasting tonnage, but when trade is dull we know not what portion, of our vessels enrolled and licensed, is actually employed" (p. 20.)—If our trade were *dull* now, how does he account for the rapid increase, shown by his tables, in this tonnage? This is the very point between us. Whether the tables are true or false, they show an increase, every year, of vessels paying for enrolments, and a greater increase than ever was known before.—In the face of this fact will he assure us that the coasting trade is dull? We know it to be untrue, and so does every intelligent merchant in the country.

But we have another reason to impeach the veracity of Mr. Cambreleng's statiscs. He has informed us, as we have stated above, that in 1818 the permanent tables of *registered tonnage* were corrected, when an error of 200,000 tons was discovered. And therefore, he concludes, but with what reason let the logicians determine—that in 1828 the error is to the same amount. And because the error is the same, at this last period, then there *must be*, at least, half that amount of error in the enrolled tonnage; and therefore again, the sum of enrolled tonnage must be subject to a deduction of 100,000 tons;—ergo the coasting trade is on the wane. We have never seen a more sorry enthymeme! The whole sequence of the syllogism is false.

In the first place, he has given us no proof of his 200,000 tons. If Watterston and Van Zandt's tables, commencing at page 111, give us the corrected list of registered tonnage, then the amount in 1818 was reduced from 755,101 tons to 605,088, the reduction being 149,013 tons: and if that list, continued by them up to 1826, and by the treasury reports to 1828,<sup>\*</sup> be, as we have no reason to doubt, the corrected record of registry, then in 1828 the true

<sup>\*</sup> *Vide Ante.* page 47, where we have given this list.

amount of permanent registered tonnage, differs from that of Mr. Cambreleng's uncorrected list of that year, (824,781) but 12,162 tons: and, of course, he is to apply but 6,081 tons to the coasting tonnage. In the second place, we deny any necessary connexion between the errors in the registered tonnage and in the enrolled and licensed; and, we say this, because the errors of the latter have been corrected as well as of the former, and will show, upon the same authority quoted by us above, that up to 1828, there was no material difference between the uncorrected list of enrolled and licensed tonnage and the corrected one. In 1826 according to W. & V. Z. it was but 2,603 tons.\*

We are still, however, at a loss to understand why Mr. C. should resort to the lists of registered or enrolled tonnage to exhibit the state of the navigation, when he had a much more infallible guide before him: unless it be that he found in the obscurity of the first a pretext for indulging in conjectures that better suited the purpose of his argument than the incontrovertible facts of the latter. For, whether the permanent tables of the tonnage be true or false, there can be no uncertainty in the yearly returns of the shipping which enters and departs from the United States. And, as these represent accurately the *number of voyages*, made in each year, they furnish the only sure and unquestionable indices of the state of our trade with every quarter of the world. It is because they do so, that we have already given some extracts from them, and we rely upon them, in preference to any other proofs that can be afforded. They exhibit the shipping that pays the tonnage duties and licenses, and, consequently, present the actual employment of our commerce. We hold it therefore a disingenuous thing in Mr. C. to give us, what he acknowledges to be an uncertain guide to the state of the commerce of the country, when he had a better one at his dis-

\* The corrected list of tonnage enrolled and licensed is thus stated in the tables referred to:

1818	618,480	1821	677,137	1824	697,580
1819	647,134	1822	693,415	1825	699,262
1820	660,065	1823	671,765	1826	762,153

This table excludes the tonnage employed in the whale fishery, and from the year 1823, it excludes the Steam-boat tonnage, which, in 1826, was 34,058 tons.

popul. It is cheating us by false tokens: giving the official and authoritative sanction, of a grave committee of lawgivers to an affirmation that, in its scope and purpose, is absolutely untrue. But Mr. C. is bent upon destroying our navigation, and the virtue of the end has cast its proper hue upon the means.

Still, there is but little gained to Mr. Cambreleng's argument, if his statements were open to none of these exceptions: for even admitting that the return of the permanent registered tonnage, or of the unregistered, was defective to the extent that he has alleged, there is something in the fact to impair the value of the comparison of our present tonnage, with the tonnage of twenty years ago, as there is no reason afforded us to suppose that the same accidental disturbances did not exist then as fully as at present.

Besides our list of entering and departing tonnage, which we assert to be the best evidence of trade, there is another method of determining the increase, equally as sure, though not as minute; that is, by an estimate of the bulk of our exports. If the quantities of products exported have greatly increased since 1818, it follows, that the shipping employed in its transportation must have experienced some commensurate increase. An examination into the quantity of our exports and, especially, of cotton, will show that this induction has been supplied, to a very notable degree, since 1818. Overstocked markets and occasional depressions of trade may have produced some vibrations in the scale, but the permanent and manifold increase of our products, obvious to any one who will take the trouble to examine the numerous treasury returns belonging to this concern, leaves no room to doubt the justice of our position.

We proceed, from this view of our own tonnage, to Mr. Cambreleng's comparison of it with the British. It is as much his purpose to show the ruinous effects of our policy by this contrast, as by the comparison he has made of our present navigation with that of his favourite era of pretended free trade. This has furnished a rich field for his execrable genius. Here he rambles, at pleasure, through his Cammerian wilds of uncertainty, and expatiates, with the ardour of a gifted spirit of romance, unchecked by the proximity of the

departments, and your scurvy pestilent documents. Here he hopes to indulge in the luxuriance of fabricated vouchers, without the fear of "some damned good natured friend" to tell him of his faults. But let him not deceive himself! We have him in leading strings still; and we shall not be overhasty to be persuaded to let go our hold.

In the course of our remarks on Mr. Cambreleng's estimates of American navigation, we have had occasion to show, that where there were two lists before him, namely,—the permanent registry of the tonnage, and the *yearly employment* of it,—finding that the first presented the most unfavourable view of the navigation, he chose to depend upon it, although he was aware of intrinsic defects sufficient to bring it into disrepute—and to pass the other by, as unworthy to be mentioned—seeing that it told a tale not altogether consistent with his theory. The very same thing has happened in Mr. Cambreleng's view of British navigation, and, strange as it may appear, the worthy chairman has made, in this instance, the very opposite choice. In Great Britain there is a list of tonnage registered, and also, *annual returns of its employment*, which present much greater diversity in the results, than we have been able to discover in the American. It is singular too, that our discriminating advocate of free trade should not have had, in the case of the British tonnage, the same motive to renounce the registered list that he had in the case of our own; for, in the British return there is no room for an error similar to that which was discovered in ours in 1819.\* The British registry contains, not only the number of tons, but likewise, a specification of the vessels, and the number of seamen, employed by them in each year—an advantage that does not belong to our own Treasury reports. The *second return* of the British shipping is intended to show the number of entrances and departures, and, consequently, in this return the same ship may contribute to swell the list of tonnage, by the amount of her frequent entries. Now Mr. Cambreleng has chosen the *second*, because it will make the tonnage appear to the greatest advantage, while he has selected the *first* return of the American, for the converse reason.

\* The British shipping was registered *de novo* under Mr. Huskisson's late consolidation of the navigation laws, in the 6th Geo. IV.

son. We have shown, also, that the *departing tonnage*, in this country, is invariably the largest, inasmuch as it embraces all new built vessels which leave our ports and which may be sold abroad. Mr. Cambreleng, perhaps aware of some such advantage on the part of the British, has chosen to bring into the contrast, the tonnage *cleared out* from British ports in each year. Thus we stand to be compared: on the American side, the worst aspect in which our tables could present us; on the British side the very best. Truly, Mr. C. is an able general, and marshals his forces with a considerate eye to his weak points! He understands the art of putting his best foot foremost. Having thus drawn up his battle, he falls pell-mell upon us with all the fury of Friar John of the Funnels upon the Cake-bakers of Lerne, and crushes us, certainly, a sore dismay.

Now, we do not say that our adversary has not truly stated the amount of British tonnage clearing outwards to all parts of the world; but we know that the British statements of tonnage clearing outwards in foreign trade, include the clearances to Guernsey, Jersey, Man, Alderney and to all their colonies and possessions abroad, since all these are ranked as foreign ports, and not included in the coasting tonnage,\* and that in all these voyages, most of which are much shorter than a great many of our coasting voyages, the entries are repeated at every trip. We know further, that in the year ending January 5th 1827, when Mr. Cambreleng states the clearing tonnage to have been 2,676,263 tons, the actual tonnage which cleared outwards from Great Britain and Ireland for foreign nations, was 918,213 tons; the rest is made up by the clearances to the possessions above mentioned, of which that to Ireland alone was 760,000.†

\* Ireland, until 1823, was regarded in the same point of view—since that period, the intercourse between the two Kingdoms has been included in the coasting trade.

† We are indebted for these details to a valuable communication published in the Essex Register, March 8, 1830. And they are confirmed by a reference to Blackwood's Magazine, 1827, in a review of Mr. Huskisson's speeches on the Shipping Interest of Great Britain.

We perceive that the Essex Register is still going on with the subject; and we are quite certain that Mr. Cambreleng is in very good hands. The materials are ample, to show that the report presents the most unwarrantable misrepresentations, both of British and American shipping.

In order to comprehend better the nature of the British registered tonnage by their returns, it must be understood that the laws of Great Britain require all vessels to be registered, except those of a burthen less than fifteen tons employed in the river or coast navigation of the Kingdom or the Colonies, and vessels under thirty tons employed in the New Foundland fishery,\* which circumstance, at once, plainly indicates the impossibility of making a fair comparison of the British tonnage with ours by the official returns of the two countries.

By this system of registry, the British list of registered ships comprehends what is equivalent to our shipping employed both in the foreign and the coasting trade, and if it could be ascertained what was the actual amount of American registered and enrolled tonnage, this would be the proper aggregate to compare with the British register list. Such a comparison would show, that at this period we are at no great distance in the rear of our British rival,—perhaps not 500,000 tons. But our concern, at present, is with the increase or decline of the navigation of Great Britain.

In an essay upon this subject from Blackwood's Magazine for September 1828, the writer remarks, in reply to some such argument as Mr. Cambreleng has set up; "It is needless for us to say that the tonnage entries are of no moment, if they be not accompanied by a corresponding increase in the number of ships and seamen possessed by the country. According to parliamentary papers this country possessed

In 1826	24,625 ships which measured 2,635,644 tons.
In 1827	23,199 - - - - 2,460,500
<hr/>	
Decrease the last year	1,426 - - - - 175,144
<hr/>	
This country possessed	
In 1816	25,864 ships - - - - 2,789,940
In 1827	23,199 - - - - 2,460,500
<hr/>	
Decrease since 1816	2,665 - - - - 323,440†"

\* Abbot on Shipping, p. 28,

† We annex a list of the amount of British shipping, as given in the article

The above short statement is quite sufficient to show, that with all the attempts of Mr. Huskisson—and following him, of Mr. Cumber-  
ling—to propagate a belief in the prosperity of British navigation, it has been declining, whilst ours has gone on multiplying, notwithstanding that “*simultaneous change of policy*” to which Mr. C. has attributed such melancholy effects. And this exposition enables us to attach a proper value to the fulsome and unmerited encomiums which our worthy chairman has passed upon those “*funda-  
mental changes*” that “have regenerated the British empire, given a wide range to her commerce, and an active impulse to her power and resources.”

Mr. C. proceeds, very gravely, to tell us, “that the *more increase*” in the coasting tonnage of Great Britain, “for five years, is *more than equal* to the whole enrolled and licensed tonnage of the U. States, whether employed on our coast, on the Mississippi, Missouri, Ohio, on our northern lakes, or in the fisheries.” (page 22.) We say in answer to him, that we have grounds to believe that the *whole coasting tonnage* of Great Britain—not the *more increase* of it—does *not equal* the coasting tonnage of the United States. Our coasting tonnage pays for its license once a year, and is reported but once in each year to the government. The British tonnage is entered at each port in every voyage, and consequently, the same vessel in its weekly or daily voyages backwards and forwards, adds, at each entry, its full amount of tonnage to the return.—

“Many of them—come with one tide and return with the above referred to in Blackwood’s Magazine, 1827, estimated from the public documents of that nation.

1816 No. of ships 25,864, measuring 2,784,940 tons, employing 178,000 men.			
1817	25,246	2,684,986	171,013
1818	25,507	2,674,463	173,609
1819	25,482	2,666,396	174,318
1820	25,374	2,648,593	174,514
1821	25,036	2,560,303	169,183
1822	24,643	2,519,044	166,333
1823	24,548	2,506,760	165,474
1824	24,776	2,559,587	168,637
1825	24,280	2,553,682	166,183
1826	24,625	2,635,644	167,536
1827	23,199	2,460,500	151,515

Next." The comparison, therefore, between the two, is wholly disproportioned. The whole British coasting tonnage has been estimated, in 1827, at about 500,000 tons;\*, while ours, according to our congressional reports, was, in the same year, 873,497 tons—the difference being greatly in our favour. Mr. Cambreleng with a credulity that sorts well with the complexion of his prejudices, has actually set down the coasting tonnage of Great Britain in 1827, at 8,648,868 tons!—and its increase, in four years, at 1,121,021, tons!! His increase of the British foreign tonnage, during the same period, is stated at, but 337,467 tons. We are surprised that Mr. C. should not have been admonished by this discrepancy itself, of the enormous mistake he had fallen into. The coasting tonnage of Great Britain increasing in a ratio of more than three to one over the foreign! And the disproportion between the two so exorbitant as eight millions to two!—the *mere increase* of coasting tonnage, in four years, nearly equal to one half of the foreign commercial marine of the most gigantic maritime power on the globe! All this apparent upon the statements of the learned chairman himself; and yet not one misgiving of his own conscience to induce a stricter examination. In our own country, he has discovered that the coasting and foreign tonnage hold a close relationship, and that one waits upon the other. But in England, it seems, things are quite the reverse; the home trade there is worth four times as much to the shipping interest as the foreign: What a commentary upon the value of the protective system! What a complete overthrow to all of the refined speculations, about the value of foreign trade, in which our acute system-monger has indulged. Mr. C. is, evidently, startled at his eight millions of coasting tonnage, and its vast increase in four years. It is almost too much for him. He falls into a speculation how such a thing *could be*—not at all doubting that *it was*—and, therefore, hints, that although this increase is principally owing "to

\* "If 5000 vessels averaging 100 tons, and five hands make eight voyages each annually, in the coasting trade, they will give 8,000,000 tons of inward tonnage in the general return. They will employ 25000 seamen."

"We have been assured by those who are conversant with the subject, that the whole coasting trade does not employ more than 500,000 tons of shipping; looking at the actual number of ships, and excluding their repeated voyages." *Blackwood's Magazine*, vol. 22, p. 140.

the rapid increase of her navigation in the coasting trade,"—yet it was partly owing "to the *inclusion of the Irish tonnage!*"—Yes, Mr. Cambreleng!—and partly, to a slight *confusion of ideas*, besides! The fact is, Mr. C. by too closely following Mr. Huskisson, has got fairly bewildered, and has almost strangled himself with his subject. We have no disposition to press the point further upon him: His ignorance is manifest, and we apprehend no danger whatever, from permitting him and his statements, henceforth, to go at large. Being aware of the dissimilarity between the British and American systems of recording the tonnage, we do not attempt to institute comparisons founded on the returns of the two countries. The British register list contains both their foreign and coasting tonnage, with the exceptions that we have mentioned before, of vessels under fifteen tons, &c. Our list of *enrolled tonnage*, perhaps, contains some portions of the *registered*, and consequently the aggregate of the two may not fairly represent the amount of tonnage.\* The British returns of the employment of their shipping in the coasting trade contain reduplications of the same tonnage at every time it enters or leaves a port of the kingdom. Our returns of the *enrolled tonnage* give no such repetitions; and consequently there are not sufficient points of resemblance upon which we may compare them with each other. We have, however, the number of British ships

\*Mr. Cambreleng tells us that it contains 277,804 tons. We have no other authority for this fact and we are therefore obliged to confess our doubts. It may turn out to be like the 200,000 tons error in the registry. Our own opinion is, though we do not speak with certainty, that what is returned as the *permanent enrolled tonnage* of each year, contains no part of this registered tonnage, or, if any, a very small one, and, that in some of the numerous aggregates, made up at the Treasury-Department, an accurate list of the actual tonnage is exhibited. If this supposition be correct, the present tonnage of the United States is upwards of one million seven hundred thousand tons. (We have not seen the returns of 1829; but we are told that they show a still greater increase in the coasting tonnage.) At all events, the returns of the whole tonnage, 'rough-hew them how you may'—make what allowances Mr. Cambreleng chooses—show constant and *unequivocal increase in the shipping of the United States*, which is the main point, and may reassure Mr. C., if he be not too far gone in despondency, that our commercial marine and our 'naval ascendancy' are both in very good keeping.

and seamen employed in their marine, both coasting and foreign, and the exhibition of this displays an almost uninterrupted decline of British navigation since 1816. Our own returns of registered shipping and of enrolled, together with the returns of the employment of both, show in *each of these departments* a visible increase since 1816, and *particularly since 1824*. The conclusions these documents afford are irresistible—Mr. C. may entertain us with disquisitions upon free trade, and speculate in unauthorised and extravagant suppositions; he may hunt through the multitudinous varieties of figures, in the reports, to select unfavorable proportions out of them, where by chance he may find, in some distant eras, a few disconnected facts, to give a seeming to his theory—but he can never persuade us to resist the evidence we have furnished him of the prosperity of our navigation, and the decline of our rivals. Trade may at one period be dull, and at another active—this fact does not alter the general result. We do not mean to contend that our navigation is as profitable to us, as it has been, or that our mercantile adventure brings in its former harvest to the country; but we do contend, that we have bettered it by our system, and saved it from the paralysis to which this ill-begotten madness of free trade might have exposed us. We would now prefer to return to our discriminating tonnage duties, rather than relax them another degree, and we would endeavour to bring about, as much as possible, that kind of free trade, of which we once experienced the benefits—whose characteristic feature was to have the freedom all on our own side, leaving to our antagonists none. We are not afraid of the countervailing policy of our rivals. They will countervail when they can, with very little regard—whatever their admiration may be—to our generosity. Great Britain has steadily met us in this way, ever since we became a nation: and her whole object now, in opening the trade of Canada and reducing her duties—let Mr. Huskisson and Mr. Grant, and their ally Mr. Cambreleng, descant upon it as they may—is to vex and embarrass our trade. Their designs are hostile, and should be met as such. The threat to throw in upon us, from Canada, a flood of contraband commerce, is an insolent bravado, which the spirit of our nation should meet as it deserves. If its design be to force us into a system of measures, necessary to them,

and injurious to our interests, we should treat it as a defiance, and let Great Britain know, that, powerful as she may esteem herself, and arrogant as she is, she is, at least, as vulnerable as ourselves. If we mistake not, she has already found the wide frontier of Canada as troublesome to her, as it can possibly be to us. We do not speak without warrant when we say, that, at this very moment, the American manufactures travel as smoothly across that frontier, as the British, and if Mr. Cambreleng desires evidence of the fact he may find it amongst his own constituents. The opening of the British Northern Colonies is the least of all possible concessions to the spirit of free trade;—it is like other gulls that have deceived our sapient merchant statesman;—it may furnish a text for his preaching, but it will bring upon him the laughter and ridicule of those who have caught him in so feeble a snare. When we broke up the trade of British vessels from the West Indies, this same rival of ours made such another concession to the principle, when she opened the island of Bermuda. Mr. Cambreleng would call this, perhaps, a step in the advance of liberal legislation. It was a countervailing measure of hostile aspect. It did for her what it was intended to do;—gave her the carrying of American products destined for the West India market. Its object was protection, not free trade—to expand her own trade by crippling that of her rival. In short, to make the trade free—to herself, but to nobody else.\* We have no reason to expect any other measure of liberality from foreign powers. They are all interested in procuring as much freedom of trade as it is possible to get without reciprocating it—and our interest is very much like theirs.

\* We have an amusing exposition of this free trade principle, in one of the resolutions of the *free trade* Chamber of Commerce in Baltimore, published for the edification of Congress, in March 1822.

"Resolved, at the opinion of this Chamber, that *commerce flourishes most, where it is most free*; that the importance and value of the American Commerce will be promoted by allowing our sea-ports to be made the depot of all foreign productions, subject, nevertheless, to such duties as the wisdom of Congress may prescribe; and, *Provided that no drawback of duties is allowed on exportation by any foreign vessel.*" Well done gentleman! a fine crank free trade—but somewhat lop-sided.

The eighth and tenth propositions imputed to Mr. Cambreleng, we leave to stand upon their own merits. They are mere assertions inconsistent with all the facts we have exhibited.

We have thus noticed, more minutely than we, at first, intended, the principal heresies in doctrine, and the gross misstatements of facts, contained in the report. Mr. Cambreleng has copied, almost without the intermixture of an original idea, his notions, as well as the facts he has brought to illustrate them, from Mr. Huskisson's several speeches in Parliament. Mr. Huskisson has not escaped censure, both in parliament and out of it, for some disingenuous collocation of facts, and for a studied effort to conceal unsavourable conclusions. We have seen how far his imitator and disciple in this country has been true to the school of his master; but what in Mr. Huskisson, might be regarded as, perhaps, a venial duplicity, becomes a reprehensible extravagance in Mr. Cambreleng, because its tendency, if it have any power, is to expose us to all the machinations of our rivals. If British ministers could desire to influence American counsels, for their own advantage, their purpose could not be better accomplished, than by the wrong-headed zeal of our Chairman of the Committee of Commerce. They fear the effect of the American tariff, and are full as importunate in persuading us to forego this system as Mr. Cambreleng. Their urgency in the enterprize betrays their interest—and that alone is a sufficient reason to distrust them. There have been some reductions of duties in England, that perhaps were salutary, but we have shown the grounds upon which they have been allowed. The British restrictions, in the mildest shape and most reduced forms, are actually higher protections to industry, than our heaviest duties. If what in Great Britain is called the free trade system had its full sway, still to be on a footing with that nation, and enjoy the benefit of the same policy here, it would be necessary for us rather to *rise* than *fall* in our restrictions; so different is the posture of the two powers. One country has attained to a maturity that gives her a command almost over the whole globe;—the other is yet, comparatively, in its infancy, and Mr. Cambreleng would persuade us into an *equal* competition! It is like a boxer from the training school of Barclay, inviting an unpractised hand into the ring, on equal terms. As it is our destiny to be obliged to contend with this adversary, we claim the privilege

of choosing the weapons. 'The American rifle is a very sure shot, and we choose to fight with it: Our antagonist is likely to be disconcerted by the choice.'

There is one portion of Mr. Cambreleng's report which we do not find so much reason to quarrel with. It is the discussion that he has introduced upon the impolicy of taxing the raw material used in our manufactures. Upon this point, the resemblance between our interest and that of Great Britain is sufficiently close to render all that Mr. Huskisson has said, and all that Mr. Cambreleng has repeated in reference to it, fully entitled to our consideration. We think Mr. C. undoubtedly right in his position, that a tax upon the raw material operates as a bounty in favour of the foreign manufacturer, and if we could believe that Mr. C. advocated the repeal of these duties, with a view to the protection of our manufactures, we should hold his zeal in more respect; but regarding it only as a concomitant of his unqualified repeal of all protecting restrictions, we cannot but condemn his principle, along with his motives. We think it rather hard, that the protective system is to be prostrated through this defect—as Mr. Cambreleng well knows, that the advocates of the manufacturing interests of the United States clearly pointed out, in advance, the very evils which form the ground-work of his present assault. They foresaw the injury that was about to be done to the interests they sought to protect; but if we mistake not, Mr. Cambreleng himself, and others of his way of thinking, voted for these duties, and enlisted forces to sustain them, with no other purpose than to render the law odious to the people and injurious to the manufacturers. These provisions were forced, therefore, upon the friends of our manufactures, who had the alternative presented them of no protection at all, or protection encumbered with all the trammels of these premeditated mischiefs. It is therefore, we think, ungracious in Mr. C. to lay these imperfections at the door of the protective system, and much more so to use them—with so exulting a tone of triumph,—as the legitimate issue of a system of policy that not only disclaims, but absolutely holds them in a common abhorrence with its opponents.

Nothing has struck us more, in the course of our review of the Report, than the almost slavish fidelity with which it has copied its

opinions and facts from Mr. Huskisson's speeches, even down to the ridiculous assertion that the free trade doctrine numbered amongst its supporters the name of Mr. Pitt, whose whole system of administration was notoriously one of restrictions and protections upon every branch of industry. But it does not often happen that the repetition, by the disciple, of the lectures of his master, should, of itself, import an impeachment of their wisdom. This, however, is the fact in the present instance. The adoption of Mr. Huskisson's views by Mr. Cambreleng, is an emphatic condemnation of their propriety in English policy.—Mr. Huskisson recommends the measure of entering into reciprocity treaties with foreign nations, upon the ground that they will be favourable to the increase of the proportion of British navigation employed in the trade, and illustrates his position by showing, what Mr. Cambreleng has repeated after him,—that the quantity of British tonnage employed in the American trade has increased since the convention of London.\*—Mr. Cambreleng, who seems not to be aware that he is on this side of the Atlantic, recommends the same measure in order to prevent this increase. Either he or his oracle must be mistaken. We leave them to settle that point between them, and, for ourselves, are content to recommend a reciprocal treaty with all those nations whose navigation is not as vigorous as our own, and to refuse such alliances with powers that are able to navigate on cheaper or more advantageous terms than we do ourselves;—in other words, as we have before declared,—to give as much encouragement to our own navigation as we can, and as little as possible to that of our rivals. Every privilege which we can acquire for our shipping abroad,

\* There is some difference of opinion between Mr. Huskisson and the British writers upon the effect of the reciprocity treaties. They affirm and show by parliamentary returns, in opposition to Mr. H., that the shipping interest of Great Britain, has suffered very materially by these treaties; and that the amount of British shipping employed in the trade of foreign countries, on the whole, has diminished. In our trade, we do not deny the increase; Mr. H. attributes this to the convention of London. If this be true, it is a strong argument in favor of our return to discriminating duties again. We are altogether certain that it has not resulted from the protective system of this country.

is, in its effect, protection and encouragement, and therefore enters into our system. Indeed, we are not inclined to dispute with Mr. Cambreleng, that it would be to our advantage to extend this system to all the world, as we believe that we can build and navigate at less expense than any of our commercial rivals, and, consequently, that we should be able to wrest from them the carriage of their own merchandise. We are, even, willing to reciprocate with Mr. Huskisson, if he will open the ports of Great Britain completely to our rivalry—not confining the free trade to articles the growth or manufacture of either country. We opine that in one year we should give the free trade philosophers of Great Britain a commentary upon their text that they might study to advantage for the rest of their lives. This perfection of the theory, however, does not enter into the views of the British statesmen. They are not willing to go farther than to allow each country to carry its own products—thus defining the high-water mark to which the flood of free trade is permitted to rise. We would suggest it to the consideration of the philosophers, whether this also, be not an unwarrantable interference with the laws of nature.

We have some complaints to make against the opponents of the tariff system in general. We have to charge them with a want of candid and fair argument of the question. They have never been content to rest their principles upon the proof of facts, but, on the contrary, have exerted all their ingenuity to escape the conviction which daily experience is constantly affording. The report is, almost, the only document that has been published in the United States, that professes to deal with the subject as one to be adjudged by the present or past history of the country. The mode of assault heretofore practised, from which even the report is not altogether free, has consisted rather in awakening the prejudices and alarming the fears of particular interests, than of canvassing principles and discussing the value of passing experiments. The planters of the south have been wrought up into a state of feeling amounting to terror, lest Great Britain, in some vindictive moment, should deny herself the use of American cotton in her manufacture. A vain fear! Our restrictions have already been in operation for twelve years, and our exports to Great Britain have been

continually increasing. If that nation could procure cotton on better terms elsewhere, or cultivate in it her own colonies, she has had every motive to do so. During our war she was obliged to resort to Brazil, to Egypt, and to the East Indies for her supply. Her demand at that period, was entirely sufficient to give a permanent impulse to this cultivation, if these countries had been able to gratify her wants. With the peace, however, she came back to us, and her continuance in our market is nothing less than a vital concern with her—stimulated by no sense of friendship, nor sympathy of kindred, but by that paramount and omnipotent instinct, of interest and necessity, which must endure as long as the South can furnish the product on cheaper terms than the rest of the world—and, no longer.

The same species of argument has been directed to all that class, of artizans employed in the several branches of ship building. They have been threatened with the loss of their daily bread. We trust that we have sufficiently shown how futile is this threat. Our ship building daily increases, not only for our own service, but for the use of other nations. The tariff, so far from injuring this interest, has had a visible effect upon its prosperity. Our returns, as we have most conclusively proved, show a greater ratio of increase in American built ships since 1824, than before that period.

The same alarmists have attempted to frighten the farming interests, by assuring them of a certain decline in their agricultural products. Our landed proprietors are not so simple as to be deceived, by this outcry. They know, from unhappy experience, how completely the foreign demand for the produce of the soil has been closed against them, and they can calculate the benefit, better than we can do it for them, of raising up a market for their commodities at home. It is a plain proposition, level to every man's understanding, that the manufacturer of the fabrics to be used in the country had better be fed by American production, than by the growth of any other land: and the withdrawal of a large mass of our population from agriculture, to other employments, must operate favourably for those who are still left in possession of the soil.

Loud and melancholy predictions have been made of the failure of the revenue and the necessity of a resort to direct taxation. The

treasury, however, thrives amidst all these auguries, and the customs continue ample and abundant; fluctuating, it is true, from year to year, but still holding their ground without the prospect of a deficiency. Indeed, it has already become a matter of speculation what we shall do with our surplus funds after we have paid off the debt. We can hardly charge our opponents with the folly of believing that there is, yet, the remotest possibility of a resort to internal taxation: that argument seems to have died at the moment of its birth.

Last of all, with a genuine demagogue spirit, they have appealed to the passions and prejudices of the ignorant, by disseminating an opinion that the protective system is a contrivance to tax the poor, man's pittance with no better purpose than to increase the store of the rich. This argument is more than once repeated in the report. We have no design to make a formal refutation of it, but we hold it altogether unworthy of the station and pretensions of the chairman of the Committee of Commerce. It is a wretched theme of the hustings, and never urged but in the presence of the multitude. We do not know a fairer mode of taxation,—when taxation is necessary,—than that which reaches the commodities in most common use: it is equitable and diffusive, and operates in fairer proportion upon the wealthy than any other; they have their dependants, correspondent to their affluence, and pay the tax in the same ratio. The labourer avoids its pressure by throwing it into his wages—the employer takes it without the possibility of shifting it upon another.

Such have generally been the topics of alarm insisted upon by the opponents of the protective system; but they have never before attempted, that we are aware of, to show that their fears have been justified by the results. That enterprise has been left to the Committee of Commerce. With what success the effort has been attended, we leave it to our readers to determine. It has been our aim to show that the public mind has been grossly abused, and we have endeavoured to expose the misrepresentations by which the advocates of free trade have attempted to forestall the judgment of the nation, and turn it from its wisest and best designs. Time which accomplishes all things that are to be accomplished, has already set its seal upon this pernicious abuse, and furnished the most abun-

dant proofs of the incapacity, and—if we did not hold the individuals in too much respect, we should say—imbecility of that rash party whose counsels have so long sustained the unhappy warfare of opinion that still agitates the country.

This domestic dissension has enlivened the hopes of our enemies, who are not only anxiously watching the strife, but participating in it by the loud and frequent plaudits with which they cheer up the discomfited champions of free trade, both in Congress, and out of it. The busy genius of hostile rivals is abroad, and all the appliances that artful rhetoric and counteracting measures can afford, have been lavished to sustain the banner of opposition against our established, and, we may say, successful policy.

We have never pretended to assert that the prosperity or happiness of the country was concerned in the attempt to build up manufactures uncongenial with our habits, or inapplicable to our local resources.\* Our protective system has been exclusively applied to

\* The Edinburgh Review, of October last, contains an essay on the French commercial system, the object of which is to show, that the restrictive policy has been hurtful to France, in some of the branches of industry to which it has been applied. It seems that in that Kingdom they have attempted to manufacture iron, with wood for their fuel. Their coal is at a distance, the roads proverbially the worst in Europe, and wood scarce and dear. We are not surprised to learn that, under such circumstances, France cannot rival Great Britain in this manufacture. We think it folly in her to attempt it until she can provide a cheaper fuel. It is, perhaps, an equally unwise attempt in France, to restrict her supply of sugar to the islands of Martinique, Guadaloupe, and the Isles de Bourbon, since they are by no means large enough to supply her wants in this article. These are evidently examples of the impolicy of forcing national industry into channels where, from fixed and natural causes, they can never excel. It is unfair to judge the protective system by such instances—Its advocates here do not predicate its success, under such circumstances. They ask for the national protection for that industry which we possess every means of bringing to perfection.

But there is one thing in the review above cited, worth attending to, and to which we especially invite the notice of Mr. Cambreleng. The Reviewer asserts that the protected commodities in France, with which he finds so much fault, have all risen enormously in cost to the people, and this is the foundation of his reproof upon the system. How does it happen that the reduction of prices, from the war rates to the ordinary prices of peace, (see Mr. C's report,